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THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL
CONSENSUS AS TO CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE RULES
Craig M. Bradley*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has developed criminal proce-
dure rules that even the Court's fondest admirers must admit are un-
clear. Those rules are backed up with a policy of mandatory exclusion
of evidence whenever a violation is found. It is hardly surprising that
this system causes great consternation among both liberals and con-
servatives. Liberals criticize the courts, with ample justification, for
ignoring the rules (or, in the case of the Supreme Court, watering
them down) in order to avoid the suppression of evidence. Conserva-
tives criticize the courts, again with ample justification, for excluding
evidence in cases of technical and unimportant violations by the po-
lice, or, even worse, in cases where, as one New York prosecutor put
it, "if the Chief Justice were riding in the back of the police car"' he
could not have definitively told the police what to do.
American conservatives, in particular, tend to feel that U.S.
lawmakers should give greater consideration to the practices of other
countries. This is because they believe that the U.S. rules are much
more pro-defendant than those of other countries, and that compara-
tive study supports the view that U.S. rules should be revised to pro-
vide greater leeway for the police. Thus, former Chief Justice Burger
declared that the exclusionary rule was "unique to American
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jurisprudence," 2 and Judge Malcolm Wilkey has argued that "one
proof of the irrationality of the exclusionary rule is that no other civi-
lized nation in the world has adopted it."'3
The most recent, and comprehensive, conservative attack on U.S.
criminal procedure has come from the Justice Department's Office of
Legal Policy. In a series of papers prepared between 1985 and 1989,
4
the Department systematically attacked U.S. criminal procedure law
as unduly interfering with the "truth-finding" process. The Depart-
ment referred on numerous occasions to the laws of other countries,
and cited my own work on Germany5 several times, in an effort to
show that the Miranda warning requirement, as well as the exclusion-
ary rules for both interrogation and search violations, are aberrational
rules that every other country has had the sense to ignore.
The Justice Department's claims about the laws of specific coun-
tries will be discussed below. In general, after studying several "conti-
nental and commonwealth countries," it concluded that the "system-
atic exclusion of evidence" due to improper police conduct of searches
is "unique to America."' 6 As to confessions, "the critical question in
determining the admissibility of statements [in other countries] is
likely to be whether they are voluntary or uncoerced... not whether
the police observed the required procedures."' 7 Moreover, "[e]ven
when the warnings are required, their omission need not result in the
exclusion of subsequent statements."8
This article will demonstrate that these general claims, as well as
certain observations about specific countries, were, with one significant
exception, substantially wrong when they were written. More impor-
tantly, due to significant developments in several countries in the years
2. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
3. Malcolm R. Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICA-
TURE 215, 216 (1978). See also J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GER-
MANY 69 (1977): "The constitutional exclusionary rules are for the most part an American
peculiarity. Illegally obtained evidence is generally admitted not only in Germany and other
continental legal systems, but also in England and the Commonwealth Systems."
4. Stephen J. Markman, Foreword: The "Truth in Criminal Justice" Series, 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 425, 430 (1989).
5. Dept. of Justice Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General on the Law of Pre-
trial Interrogation: Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. I (Feb. 12, 1986), reprinted at 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REP. 437, 540 nn.306-08 (1989) [hereinafter Interrogation Report] (citing Craig M.
Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1049-52 (1983)); Dept. of
Justice Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General on the Search and Seizure Exclu-
sionary Rule: Truth in Criminal Justice Report No. 2 (Feb. 26, 1986), reprinted at 22 U. MICH.
J.L. RP. 573, 620-21 n.125 (1989) [hereinafter Search Report] (citing Bradley, supra note 5).
6. Search Report, supra note 5, at 617.
7. Interrogation Report, supra note 5, at 541.
8. Id. at 542.
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since those reports came out, they are even more wrong now. That is,
not only have the U.S. concepts of pre-interrogation warnings to sus-
pects, a search warrant requirement, and the use of an exclusionary
remedy to deter police misconduct been widely adopted, but in many
cases other countries have gone beyond the U.S. requirements.
However, in one very important respect, no other country has gone
as far as the United States. This is the scope of the mandatory exclu-
sionary rule.9 In the United States, with only a few exceptions, viola-
tion of the constitutional rules laid down by the Supreme Court always
leads to evidentiary exclusion, regardless of the seriousness of the vio-
lation, the impact on the prosecution's case, reasonable police confu-
sion about the rules, or anything else. While mandatory rules are not
unknown in other countries, a rule that leaves the exclusionary deci-
sion to the discretion of the trial judge is much more the norm. Such a
system avoids the cases that are most galling to American conserva-
tives as well as to the American public in general: dangerous criminals
going free because of minor, technical errors by the police.10 Because
all of the U.S. rules are constitutionally based, it has been difficult for
the Supreme Court to declare that although the police violated the
Constitution in a given case, it was a minor mistake.1  If all mistakes
are of a constitutional dimension they are, by definition, not "mi-
nor."12 Hence the mandatory rule.
9. Search Report, supra note 5, at 617. This is probably what the Justice Department meant
when it referred to the lack of a "systematic" rule in other countries.
10. This article is not the first time that a non-mandatory rule has been proposed for the
United States. The most notable such proposal appears in the American Law Institute's MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 150.3 (statements), 290.2 (seized evidence)
(1975), where exclusion is mandated only if a violation of the rules was "substantial" or "other-
wise constitutionally required." See also William A. Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment
Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEo. L.J. 1361, 1385 (1981).
11. Harmless error doctrine does not function the same as a discretionary exclusionary rule.
Under current U.S. law, trial judges are required to exclude evidence whenever a Fourth Amend-
ment or Miranda violation is found, subject only to the "good faith" exception in search warrant
cases, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and the "search made pursuant to an unconsti-
tutional statute" exception of Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). In the hopefully relatively
rare case where the trial judge fails to follow the law, the appellate court may, nevertheless,
affirm the conviction on "harmless error" grounds. The burden is on the government to establish
that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial. Obviously if the evidence in question was
significant to the government's case, it will not be able to make this showing.
By contrast, under a non-mandatory exclusionary rule, the trial judge is not required to ex-
clude evidence obtained in violation of the rules, unless the use of the evidence would "bring the
system of justice into disrepute" or some other test. The importance of the evidence to the gov-
ernment's case may cut in favor of admission in a discretionary exclusion regime, rather than
against it, as in the U.S. "harmless error" calculus.
12. The Supreme Court has tried to get around this problem by declaring that the Miranda
warnings are not really mandated by the Constitution, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)
(but failure to give them nevertheless leads to evidentiary exclusion, though not to exclusion of
the "fruits of the poisonous tree"); and by creating a "good faith exception" to the exclusionary
rule in the case of a defective search warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. 897. Nevertheless, the prevailing
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Even from the point of view of a civil libertarian, the mandatory
exclusionary rule causes practical problems. First, because rule viola-
tions almost always lead to exclusion, the Court has been reluctant to
establish rules in areas such as night searches or length and conduct of
interrogations, for fear that such rules would simply provide undeserv-
ing defendants more opportunities to "beat the rap." Second, the
knowledge that finding a violation by the police will lead to automatic
exclusion naturally causes courts to be reluctant to declare a violation
at all, even when, to a dispassionate observer, such a violation seems
clear.13 This reluctance, and the hedging and fudging to which it gives
rise, inevitably leads to confusion about the meaning of the rule in
question.
Until very recently, my study of the criminal procedure of other
countries had led me to the conclusion that a discretionary exclusion-
ary rule was, for all practical purposes, a non-exclusionary rule.14 In
other words, a discretionary rule was worthless for deterring anything
but the most outrageous behavior by the police. The courts simply
were not excluding evidence often enough in cases involving clear, but
not egregious, violations to have any impact on ordinary police behav-
ior. In recent years, however, this has begun to change.
This article examines six countries: Australia, Canada, England,
France, Germany, and Italy. Of these, all have a code of criminal
procedure,15 all generally require a warrant to search a residence, all
require some warnings to suspects prior to interrogation, and all use
an exclusionary remedy to back up the rules. Some countries have
view, even on this extremely conservative Supreme Court, is that rule violations automatically
lead to exclusion.
13. In a study published in 1988 of search and seizure decisions from nine states, I found
that, in 10.3% of the 223 cases studied, appellate courts ruled for the government when, accord-
ing to the law, they should have ruled for the defendant. Craig M. Bradley, Are State Courts
Enforcing the Fourth Amendment? A preliminary Study, 77 GEo. L.J. 251, 258 (1988).
This problem with the mandatory exclusionary rule has been noted in other countries that
have rejected it. The Australian Law Reform Commission has observed that the mandatory rule
"tempts courts to reduce the protection of the substantive search-seizure rules by holding that no
illegality has occurred in order to avoid important evidence being excluded." Craig M. Bradley,
Criminal Procedure in the "Land of Oz'" Lessons for America, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
99, 122 n.142 (1990) (quoting LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 2 (INTERIM), CRIMI-
NAL INVESTIGATION 140 (1975)).
See generally Schroeder, supra note 10, at 1382 n.172 and sources cited therein.
14. E.g., I concluded that "the discretionary rule currently in force in Australia, which is
'often mentioned but rarely acted on,' can hardly be considered an adequate safeguard for civil
liberties." Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the "Land of Oz, " supra note 13, at 122 (footnote
omitted).
15. However, the Australian Code applies only to federal authorities. All other countries
studied have a nationally applicable code. As I propose in my forthcoming book, The Failure of
the Criminal Procedure Revolution (U. of Pa. Press, forthcoming 1993), a nationally applicable
code is both constitutionally possible and highly desirable in this country.
[Vol. 14:171
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rules that are more restrictive of the police than the United States;
others, notably France, are less restrictive. But the trend, particularly
manifested by decisions in just the last three or four years, is in the
direction of setting clear and rather restrictive standards for police be-
havior, especially with respect to interrogations, and backing up those
standards with a discretionary, but regularly employed, exclusionary
rule.
In contrast to the U.S. system, neither continental nor common-
wealth systems declare rules by first finding a constitutional violation
in an individual case. Rather, most other countries of which I am
aware have a nationally applicable criminal procedure code, written,
and kept up to date, by a legislatively appointed commission. Such a
commission, naturally, is not forced to declare rules case-by-case, but
rather tries to anticipate and account for problems in advance. 16 Since
the courts do not have to use individual cases to establish rules, they
can use them in the more usual way: to interpret existing rules and
determine the appropriate remedies for their violation. With increas-
ing frequency, foreign courts are finding that breaches of the codes by
police should lead to evidentiary exclusion, but if such a result would
be unjust in a particular case it is not required.17
While the Supreme Court's cooption of this field has essentially
eliminated the role of U.S. states as "laboratories" where new ideas
can be tested, we can view foreign countries as playing an analogous
role. However, we must remember that no other industrialized coun-
try has the high level of crime of the United States, nor the same level
of racial, ethnic, and economic diversity. Consequently, criminal pro-
cedure rules which are effective in Italy or Australia will not necessar-
ily work in the United States. On the other hand, if a certain approach
has been accepted or rejected by most of the other industrialized coun-
tries, it behooves U.S. lawmakers to take heed.18
16. That such a code, applicable to state and federal authorities alike, should be enacted by
the federal government in the United States (and could be enacted under our constitutional struc-
ture) is the subject of my forthcoming book, supra note 15. See discussion infra notes 326-27 and
accompanying text.
17. Just what the appropriate standard should be for deciding the admissibility of evidence
obtained as a result of a rule violation is not a matter as to which there is international consensus,
and is left open in this article.
18. It is obviously necessary to evaluate a significant number of countries in order to deter-
mine whether a trend is occurring. Consequently, despite my lack of "on the scene" experience
with four of the countries discussed and my inability to even read French and Italian, I have
undertaken to discuss six countries in this study. I have obtained advice from experts on the
criminal law and procedure of all of the countries except Canada, as well as some research assist-
ance in French and Italian law, in addition to relying on secondary sources.
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ENGLAND AND WALES1 9
According to Bevan and Lidstone, leading commentators on the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984,
Before [the Act], the law governing police powers for the investiga-
tion of crime was unclear and antiquated. It had developed piecemeal
since the establishment of professional police forces in the nineteenth
century. Parliament had added fitfully to the few common law princi-
ples.... This varied and scant law was supplemented by (a) rules of
guidance as to the admissibility of confessions provided by the Lord
Chief Justice [in consultation with the judiciary]; (b) national adminis-
trative guidance in the form of Home Office circulars ... and (c) local
administrative [rules]. The result was patchy legal obligations and pow-
ers for the police and local variations in powers .... A wide-ranging
overhaul of the system had been due for many years. New and heavier
pressures on the police and a more critical public opinion demanded that
the powers of the police be placed on a modem statutory footing.
20
Consequently, a Royal Commission (the Phillips Commission) was
formed, and in 1981 it issued a report proposing a comprehensive stat-
utory reform of the law of police practices. 21 After extensive parlia-
mentary debate, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act [PACE] was
passed in 1984. The Act contains eight principal parts: I. Powers to
Stop and Search; II. Powers of Entry, Search and Seizure; III. Arrest;
IV. Detention; V. Questioning and Treatment of Persons by Police;
VII. Documentary Evidence in Criminal Proceedings; VIII. Evidence
in Criminal Proceedings; IX. Police Complaints and Discipline; plus
three other sections devoted to miscellaneous details. The Act is sup-
plemented by Codes of Practice, issued by the Home Office, covering
in greater detail such areas as interrogations, identification procedures
and searches and seizures of property.
While, not surprisingly, the Act has attracted criticism from both
left and right for the substance of its provisions, 22 there seems to be
general agreement that the legislation successfully "codif[ies] and con-
19. What will be referred to in this discussion as the "English" rules govern England and
Wales. Scotland operates under separate rules, embodied in the Criminal Justice Act (Scotland)
1980. Northern Ireland is governed by rules similar to England's, embodied in the Police and
Criminal Evidence Act (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, which came into force in Northern
Ireland on January 1, 1990.
20. VAUGHAN BEVAN AND KEN LIDSTONE, THE INVESTIGATION OF CRIME: A GUIDE TO
POLICE POWERS 1 (1991).
21. Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (1981).
22. Compare Leslie Curtis, Policing the Streets, in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES AND
PROPRIETIES 95 (John Benyon & Colin Bourn eds., 1986) (too restrictive of law enforcement)
with David Ashby, Safeguarding the Suspect, in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES AND PRO-
PRIETIES 183 (John Benyon & Colin Bourn eds., 1986).
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trol[s] an area which lacked clarity and was becoming an increasing
scandal." 23
Since the English Code may serve as a model, in its comprehen-
siveness and detail (though not necessarily in its specific provisions or
its clarity), for a U.S. codification of criminal procedure law,24 its pro-
visions will be considered in greater depth than the statutory provi-
sions of the other countries studied.25
1. Stop and Search
PACE provides that a constable may stop and search any person
or vehicle upon reasonable grounds for suspecting26 that stolen or pro-
hibited articles (i.e. weapons or instrumentalities of crime) may be
found. This power applies in public places and places "accessible to
the public," but not in dwellings or private buildings.27 "Reasonable
grounds for suspicion" is the same standard as is required to justify an
arrest.28 The Code of Practice specifies that
Whether reasonable grounds for suspicion exist will depend on the cir-
cumstances in each case, but there must be some objective basis for it...
[examples omittedi. Reasonable suspicion can never be supported on the
basis of personal factors alone. For example, a person's colour, age,
hairstyle or manner of dress, or the fact that he is known to have a previ-
ous conviction for possession of an unlawful article, cannot be used alone
or in combination with each other as the sole basis on which to search
that person. Nor may it be founded on the basis of stereotyped images of
certain persons or groups as more likely to be committing offences.29
The Code of Practice makes it clear that a search in public must
23. Ashby, supra note 22, at 188.
24. As previously noted, this is something for which I'argue in detail in my forthcoming
book, supra note 15.
25. The general enthusiasm expressed in this article for the structure of the English system
should not be read as endorsing the practices of British police, whose delicts have led to the
creation of another Royal Commission. M. McKeon, Lawyers Urge Interim Criminal Procedure
Reform, 8 LAW SOCIETY'S GAZETTE 7, 20 (Mar. 20, 1991).
26. The British distinguish between "reasonable grounds for suspecting" which is like the
U.S. "reasonable suspicion" standard, and "reasonable grounds to believe" which is "a high
standard approaching certainty of belief," seemingly somewhat stronger than the U.S. "probable
cause" standard but, in practice, probably the same. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act
§§ 2.03-2.04, reprinted in VAUGHAN BEVAN & KEN LIDSTONE, A GUIDE TO THE POLICE AND
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984 263 (1986) [hereinafter PACE], for a discussion of the
difference.
27. Id. § 1. See Richard Stone, Police Powers after the Act, in THE POLICE: POWERS, PRO-
CEDURES AND PROPERTIES 53, 54 (John Benyon & Colin Bourn eds., 1986).
28. CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE EXERCISE BY POLICE OFFICERS OF STATUTORY POWERS
OF STOP AND SEARCH § 1.5, in BEVAN & LIDSTONE, A GUIDE TO THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE ACT 1984 app. at 559 [hereinafter STOP AND SEARCH CODE].
29. Id. §§ 1.6-1.7.
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be "restricted to superficial examination of the outer clothing, '30
but a more extensive search may occur in a nearby police van or
stationhouse if "reasonable grounds" for further searching exist. The
time for which a person or vehicle may be detained is limited to what
is reasonable to permit such a search to be carried out.31 The search is
limited by the nature of the suspicion. Thus, a constable who suspects
that X has a gun in his coat pocket may search only that pocket.32
Each such search must be recorded and the suspect informed that
such a recording will be made.33 A separate section provides for the
stopping of vehicles at roadblocks, 34 but otherwise no special provision
is made for auto searches.
English law thus differs strikingly from that of the United States.
The English do not draw any distinction between frisks and full
searches of the person, though the "in public" search is essentially the
same as the U.S. "frisk." It is the location of the search, rather than
the level of suspicion, that determines its intensity. In addition, the
right to search a person is limited to fruits and instrumentalities of
crime, and does not extend to "mere evidence." The English "search"
is thus broader than the U.S. "frisk," which requires a suspicion that
the subject be armed and dangerous, but narrower than the U.S.
"search," which requires probable cause but may be for any evidence.
Moreover, the English search of the person does not flow automati-
cally from an arrest, as in the United States. Rather, it is limited, both
as to its inception and its scope, by "reasonable grounds for suspi-
cion. ' 35 However, once the suspect is actually taken to the police sta-
tion, the custody officer must undertake a full inventory search, as is
the practice in the United States.36
In the section of PACE relating to the law of "stop and search,"
the English have succeeded in spelling out rules that the U.S. Supreme
Court has taken thirty years to develop. Moreover, many issues that
are still unclear in U.S. law have been resolved by PACE. For exam-
ple, PACE makes it clear that a person can only be searched in the
curtilage of a house if it appears that- he does not live there or is not
there with the owner's consent.37 A similar restriction applies to
30. Id. § 3.5.
31. PACE, supra note 26, §§ 2(8)-2(9); Stone, supra note 27, at 57.
32. STOP AND SEARCH CODE, supra note 28, § 3.3; Stone, supra note 27, at 57.
33. PACE, supra note 26, § 3; Stone, supra note 27, at 57.
34. PACE, supra note 26, § 4.
35. Id. § 1(3).
36. Id. § 54.
37. Id. § 1(4).
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searches of vehicles on private property.38
Furthermore, nearly twenty-five years after Terry v. Ohio39 first
authorized investigative stops, it remains unclear in the United States
whether a frisk is justified absent evidence that "criminal activity is
afoot." That is, can the police frisk someone suspected of carrying a
weapon if carrying a weapon is not illegal, and if no independent evi-
dence of criminality exists?40 Also, can they stop and/or frisk some-
one for a non-serious, non-dangerous crime, such as possession of
narcotics? 41 A related question is whether, given the requisite suspi-
cion for a stop and frisk, the frisk may occur immediately, or whether
the police must attempt to dispel the suspicion before frisking. Terry
suggests that the latter course is appropriate, though common sense
suggests a contrary conclusion. U.S. courts are split.42
PACE resolves these matters easily (though not necessarily cor-
rectly) by allowing a stop and search any time a suspect is reasonably
believed to possess "stolen or prohibited articles" (which includes
weapons and illegal drugs). The Code of Practice makes it clear that
"there is no power to stop or detain a person against his will in order
to find grounds for a search, '43 but "[t]his Code does not affect the
ability of an officer to speak to or question a person [in the absence of
reasonable suspicion] without detaining him or exercising any element
of compulsion." 44
Thus, in England, a suspect may be stopped and frisked any time a
weapon or contraband is reasonably suspected; there is no requirement
of preliminary investigation before the frisk is performed; frisks may
not be performed for mere evidence of crime; and forcible stops for
investigatory purposes other than frisks are not allowed.45
38. Id. § 1(5).
39. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
40. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4 (a) (2d ed. 1987) (discussing the
basis for initiating a frisk).
41. See id. § 9.2(c) (discussing disagreement on this point). The case of Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325 (1990), involving an auto stop to inquire about narcotics possession (which must bejustified by the same "reasonable suspicion" as a frisk), suggests that a frisk for possession of
narcotics is appropriate.
42. LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 9.2(c).
43. STOP AND SEARCH CODE, supra note 28, § 2.1.
44. Id. § 1, Notes for Guidance IA.
45. The astute reader may have noticed that the two sections of the Code of Practice quoted
in this paragraph do not directly support the statement in this sentence that forcible stops are
never permitted for investigatory purposes. This illustrates a further advantage of statutes over
court decisons. When the code writer has delineated a limited set of circumstances in which a
certain action is allowed, it is reasonable to infer that such action is inappropriate in other than
the defined circumstances. By contrast, when a court declares a course of action appropriate
under the facts of a certain case, it is never entirely clear what the rule is under different facts.
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2. Entry, Search, and Seizure
PACE provides that
If on [a written] application made by [the police] a justice of the peace is
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing (a) that a serious
arrestable offence has been committed; and (b) that there is material on
premises specified in the application which is likely to be of substantial
value (whether by itself or together with other material). . . and (c) that
the material is likely to be relevant evidence; and (d) that it does not
consist of or include items subject to legal privilege ... and (e) any of the
conditions specified.., below applies, [a magistrate] may issue a warrant
authorizing a constable to enter and search the premises. [The warrant
must specifically identify the place to be searched and, if possible, the
person or things to be seized.46] ... The conditions mentioned... above
are (a) that it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled
to grant entry to the premises ... (c) that entry to the premises will not
be granted unless a warrant is produced; (d) that the purpose of a search
may be frustrated or seriously prejudiced unless a constable arriving at
the premises can secure immediate entry to them.47
Entry may be made without a search warrant to arrest on an arrest
warrant, or to arrest without a warrant for certain specified offenses
(generally, those punishable by imprisonment of five years or lon-
ger48), provided the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the
suspect is within.49 Such entry may also be made in hot pursuit or for
the purpose of "saving life or limb or preventing serious damage to
property," or to prevent a breach of peace. 50
The police may also enter "any premises occupied or controlled"
by the arrestee, after an arrest outside, if they have reasonable grounds
for believing that evidence of the instant, or related, offenses may be
found inside.51
Unfortunately for purposes of understanding the English law of
searches, the above-quoted sections of PACE are not the only sources
of searching authority. Rather, in this area, PACE supplements previ-
ous laws, in particular the Theft Act 1968 and the Misuse of Drugs
Act 1971, which already authorized search warrants for certain items
(generally, fruits and instrumentalities of drug and theft crimes, as op-
posed to "mere evidence"). 52 PACE extended the searching authority
This is true even if the court has attempted to extend the rule to other, hypothetical cases, for
such an extension can always be dismissed as dictum.
46. PACE, supra note 26, § 15.
47. Id. § S.
48. Id. § 24.
49. Id. § 17.
50. Id. §§ 17(1)(d)-17(1)(e), 17(6).
51. Id. § 18(1).
52. E.g., the Theft Act, 1968 ch. 60, § 26(1) (Eng.) provides that, upon reasonable cause
(Vol. 14:171
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to "mere evidence" in cases of "serious arrestable offense" (i.e. the
most serious felonies, such as murder, rape, kidnapping and other of-
fenses leading to "serious injury to any person" or "serious financial
loss") 53. Accordingly, searches for some items, in particular narcotics
and stolen property, are not subject to the same restrictions as
searches under PACE for evidence of "serious arrestable offenses." In
any event, as Bevan and Lidstone report, the great majority of
searches in England are warrantless, usually through consent (32%),
or incident to arrest (55%). Twelve percent of searches are by magis-
trate's warrant.5
4
Again, this differs from U.S. law in a number of ways. In order to
obtain a search warrant under PACE, British police must show, in
addition to reasonable grounds, essentially that exigent circumstances
require a non-consensual entry. Furthermore, searches of premises
are limited to serious arrestable offenses (and for drugs and stolen
property under other statutes) and cannot be performed to look for
privileged material. A warrantless entry apparently may not be made
because of a belief that evidence is about to be destroyed.55 None of
these limitations is present in U.S. law.
The British allow a search of premises incident to arrest, even
when the suspect is not arrested on the premises. 56 Moreover, the
search incident to arrest is not limited to the "immediate vicinity" of
the arrest when the suspect is arrested inside, as in Chimel v. Califor-
nia.57 On the other hand, searches of premises incident to arrest may
only be performed on "reasonable grounds to believe," rather than au-
tomatically as in the United States.
3. Consent Searches
The Code of Practice provides that consent to search premises
must, if practicable, be obtained in writing after the occupant has been
informed of his right to refuse consent and that anything seized may
shown, a justice of the peace may issue a search warrant to search for and seize stolen goods. If
the suspect has been convicted of a theft offense within the last 5 years, a police superintendent
may issue such a warrant. Id. § 26 (2).
53. PACE, supra note 26, § 116.
54. See VAUGHAN BEVAN & KEN LIDSTONE, A GUIDE TO THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE ACT 1984 73 (1986).
55. The reference to "preventing serious damage to property" quite clearly refers to the pro-
tective, rather than the evidence gathering, function of the police. For examples of cases in
which the police may enter under this section, see BEVAN AND LIDSTONE, supra note 26, at 74-
75.
56. U.S. law is to the contrary. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
57. PACE, supra note 26, § 4.16.
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be used in evidence.58 This offers substantially more protection than
does U.S. law, where the lax rules of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte5 9 con-
cerning consent searches provide police with a major loophole to avoid
the sometimes too stringent, and always confusing, Fourth Amend-
ment requirements. Despite the stricter English provisions, consent
searches, as noted above, remain quite common in England.
By contrast, consents to search the person need not be preceded by
warnings, and need not be in writing. Moreover, the Code require-
ments for making a record of the search do not apply. The only re-
straint is that "the officer should always make it clear that he is
seeking the co-operation of the person concerned." 6
4. Arrest and Detention
Arrests need only be based on "reasonable grounds for suspicion"
and need not be by warrant.61 The arrestee's person may be searched
only if "the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the
arrested person may present a danger to himself or others," 62 or that
he possesses something "which he might use to ... escape" or "which
might be evidence relating to an[y] offence."'63 As discussed above, the
arrest also conveys the power, but only upon reasonable grounds for
belief (i.e. probable cause), "to enter and search any premises in which
[the suspect] was when arrested or immediately before he was arrested
for evidence relating to the offence for which he [was] arrested." 64
After arrest, a "custody officer" at each station, of the rank of ser-
geant or above, who is independent of the investigation, must deter-
mine if there is sufficient evidence to charge the suspect 65 and perform
a full inventory search.66 If there are not sufficient grounds to hold
him, the suspect must be released. An arrestee may not be held longer
than 24 hours after arrival at the police station without being
58. CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE SEARCHING OF PREMISES BY POLICE OFFICERS § 4, in
MICHAEL ZANDER, THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984 381 (2d ed. 1990).
59. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
60. STOP AND SEARCH CODE, supra note 28, Notes for Guidance ID. The U.S. rule is that
"[s]o long as a reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the police and go about his busi-
ness,' the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required." Florida v. Bostick,
111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991). The Court in Bostick held that the fact that respondent did not feel
free to leave the bus on which the police sought to question him did not render the police conduct
coercive. Id.
61. PACE, supra note 26, § 24(4).
62. Id. § 32(1).
63. Id. §§ 32(2), 32(5).
64. Id. § 32(2)(b).
65. Id. § 37(1).
66. Id. § 54.
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charged.67 However, he may be held an additional 12 hours if the
superintendant in charge of the station determines that this is neces-
sary "to secure or preserve evidence relating to the offence or to obtain
such evidence by questioning him," and that the offense is a "serious
arrestable offence," and that "the investigation is being conducted dili-
gently and expeditiously. ' 68 A magistrate's court may, after a hearing
where the suspect is represented by counsel, authorize detention for
another 36 hours where the above criteria are satisfied.69 This warrant
may be extended by the magistrate's court for a total detention not to
exceed 96 hours.70 A suspect has a right not to be held incommuni-
cado during this period and to consult with counsel,71 subject to cer-
tain exceptions discussed below.
The Codes of Practice also provide detailed rules for the conditions
of detention, medical treatment of suspects, special treatment of
juveniles and the mentally ill, and so forth.72 This area represents the
most glaring omission in the U.S. system. While in 1957, in Mallory v.
United States,73 the Supreme Court held that an extended interroga-
tion (7 hours) violated the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
(which prohibited "unnecessary delay" in bringing the suspect before
a magistrate), this rule has never been extended to the states, and most
states have not adopted a similar rule.74 For some reason, the U.S.
Supreme Court has assumed that, once the suspect has received his
Miranda warnings, no further concern for what happens to him at the
police station is required. In this area, the English system is better not
only because it has rules, but because of the kind of rules it has.
5. Interrogations
The obligation of the police to inform suspects of their rights is
summed up by British authorities:
Suspects must be cautioned before an interview begins. The caution
must expressly make it clear that there is no obligation to say anything
or answer questions [and that anything said may be used in evidence.75]
67. Id. § 41(2)(a).
68. Id. § 42(1).
69. Id. §§ 43(1), 43(12).
70. Id. § 44(3)(b).
71. CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE DETENTION, TREATMENT, AND QUESTIONING OF PER-
SONS BY THE POLICE para. 5. [hereinafter INTERROGATION CODE].
72. Id. paras. 8, 10, & 13.
73. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
74. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 429 (7th ed. 1990).
75. INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 71, para. 10.4. However, contrary to U.S. practice,
see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), though the prosecution may not "suggest that an ac-
cused's silence was suspicious, they could inform the jury that the accused was silent. Nothing
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Each new bout of questioning directed to a suspect should be preceded
by a further caution, as where a person is questioned at his home, ar-
rested, and then asked further questions in the police car on the way to
the station.7 6
The custody officer must tell [the suspect] the reasons for his arrest....
[The suspect] must be told of his right to have somebody outside the
police station informed of his whereabouts.... He must be told about his
right to have legal advice [including free legal advice from the "Duty
Solicitor"7 7]. He must also be told that he has a right to a copy of the
custody record. The information to the suspect must be communicated
not only orally ... but also in writing.78
The rights of the suspect to notify someone of his whereabouts and
to consult counsel may be delayed up to 36 hours in the case of a
"serious arrestable offence," if an officer of the rank of superintendant
or above
has reasonable grounds for believing that the exercise of the rights:
i) will lead to interference with or harm to evidence.., or interference
with or physical harm to other persons; or ii) will lead to the alerting of
other persons suspected of having committed such an offence but not yet
arrested for it; or iii) will hinder the recovery of property obtained in
consequence of the commission of such an offence .... Access to a solici-
tor may not be delayed on the grounds that he might advise the person
not to answer any questions. 79
There is no right to cut off questioning by an assertion of the right
to silence80 (but subsequent questioning must not be "oppressive").
However, further questioning may not follow a request for a solicitor,
could prevent the jury from drawing adverse inferences from the fact of silence if they chose to
do so." MICHAEL ZANDER, THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1984 144 (2d ed.
1990).
76. David Feldman, Regulating Treatment of Suspects in Police Stations: Judicial Interpreta-
tion of Detention Provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 1990 CRiM. L. REv.
452, 463 (citing INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 71, paras. 10.4, 11.2).
77. INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 71, para. 6: "(Arrestees) shall be informed in writing
of these options and of the fact that option (b) [the duty solicitor] will always be free of charge."
78. Michael Zander, The Act in the Station, in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES AND
PROPRIETIES 126 (John Benyon & Colin Bourn eds., 1986). Readers familiar with the U.S.
experience with Miranda will not be surprised to learn that the police are frequently able to avoid
the anticipated impact of these tough interrogation rules by "the ploy of exploiting detainees'
disoriented state by rushing them through the drill so briskly that they clearly had little opportu-
nity to absorb [the warnings]." Nevertheless, a requirement that the suspect write out a waiver of
counsel in his own hand was rejected by Parliament and the current system that he check a box,
either requesting or refusing counsel, was retained. David Wolchover & Anthony Heaton-Arm-
strong, The Questioning Code Revamped, 1991 CRIM. L. REv. 232, 236.
The Code of Practice further provides that a poster setting forth these rights, including a
foreign language poster where appropriate, "must be prominently displayed in the charging area
of every police station." INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 71, para. 6.3.
79. INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 71, annex B.
80. See Mark Berger, Legislating Confession Law in Great Britain: A Statutory Approach to
Police Interrogations, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1, 39 (1990).
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subject to an "exigent circumstances" exception and certain others.81
Any interview in a police station must be contemporaneously recorded,
unless it is impracticable to do so, in which case the police must make a
record of why it was impracticable.8 2 [The new Code of Practice now
requires tape recording. 83] It will be regarded as impracticable to make
a contemporaneous record where, for example, the suspect refuses to
talk if the conversation is being recorded. However, police officers com-
monly claim that note-taking slows down the interrogation, gives the
suspect more time to prepare and leads to a stilted conversation. These
problems will be reduced where tape recording is used, but they will
continue to arise in relation to untaped interviews. The decisions so far
suggest that a desire to maintain the spontaneity of an interview is not a
sufficient reason for failing to make a contemporaneous record.84
In the course of interviews, stratagems designed to induce a confession
by bringing psychological pressure to bear... will not normally amount
to oppression making a confession inadmissible [but they may have that
effect depending on] the medical and psychological state of the suspect
[or if] the police actively mislead the suspect and the solicitor who has
the responsibility for advising the suspect.8 5
Thus, contrary to the claim of the Justice Department report
(which, extraordinarily, does not discuss PACE, despite its passage
two years before), England's interrogation rules are more stringent
than Miranda.86 An English suspect must be warned of his rights to
silence and counsel not only orally but in writing. Moreover, these
warnings must be given, prior to interrogation, as soon as there are
81. INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 71, para. 6.6. See Wolchover & Heaton-Armstrong,
supra note 78, at 238 (discussing this issue in greater detail). See also The Queen v. Oliphant,
1992 CRIM. L. Rav. 40 (the court dismissed an appeal based on the questioning of the defendant
after he had, somewhat ambiguously, asserted his right to a solicitor, on the ground that the
violation was not "substantial").
In the United States, the Supreme Court has held that once a suspect has invoked his right to
counsel he may not be "subject[ed] to further interrogation ... until counsel has been made
available to him, unless [he] himself initiates further communication... with the police." Ed-
wards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). However, the Court had earlier held that a
suspect's invocation of his right to silence does not necessarily prevent the police from question-
ing him again later, after some time has passed. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). See
also KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 74, at 474, 510-11.
82. The 1991 Code of Practice requires a contemporaneous record of all interviews, whether
within or outside a police station, unless it is impracticable to do so. INTERROGATION CODE,
supra note 71, para. 11.3.
83. CODE OF PRACTICE-ON TAPE RECORDING, in MICHAEL ZANDER, THE POLICE AND
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1989 429 (2d ed. 1990). For a full discussion of British interrogation
law under PACE, including the tape recording requirements, see Berger, supra note 80, at 56-57.
84. Feldman, supra note 76, at 463.
85. Id. at 464 and cases cited therein.
86. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court required that prior to
any custodial interrogation, a suspect must be warned of his right to silence; that anything he
says may be used against him; of his right to counsel; and that if he cannot afford counsel, one
will be provided free of charge.
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"grounds to suspect of an offense"87 rather than when "custody" en-
sues as in the United States. More importantly, unlike the fictitious
"right to counsel" in the Miranda warnings (the assertion of which
will not necessarily result in counsel being provided), PACE requires
that a "Duty Solicitor" be available, and that the suspect be told of
this. Finally, as of 1991, the Code of Practice requires that all interro-
gations be tape recorded where practicable.88 The United States has
no such general requirement.
6. Remedies
An American reader may respond to the foregoing recitation of the
English rules by saying that "these rules are all very well, but everyone
knows that England doesn't enforce its rules with an exclusionary
remedy." Traditionally, it was the policy of the British courts to ig-
nore violations of the rules by police, a policy that the Justice Depart-
ment, unaware of PACE in this regard as well, cited in its report.8 9
Only involuntary confessions were subject to exclusion on the ground
that they were unreliable. Otherwise, if evidence was relevant, it
would be admissible no matter how obtained. 90
PACE has completely changed both the law and the attitude of the
British Courts toward evidentiary exclusion as a means of enforcing
the law. David Feldman summarizes the new approach:
The judges in the Crown Courts and the Court of Appeal seem to have
moved away from the traditional notion that it is not the judiciary's job
to discipline the police. They treat the regulation of police practices as
being at least as important an objective as procedural fairness [in the trial
itselfj. This seems to reflect a growing disillusionment with police
pretensions to professionalism and self-regulatory capacity, a determina-
tion to make a go of the balance struck by PACE, a renewed judicial
commitment to rule of law principles and the ideal of legal accountabil-
ity for the exercise of police powers, and the failure of other forms of
legal control over the police. 91
There are four grounds for evidentiary exclusion under PACE.
87. INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 71, para. 10.1. Once a decision to arrest has been
made, the suspect should not ordinarily be questioned until he has arrived, and been cautioned,
at the police station (see infra note 97). A non-arrested suspect must be informed that he is free
to go. INTERROGATION CODE, supra note 71, para. 10.2.
88. CODE OF PRACTICE ON TAPE RECORDING, supra note 83, para. 3.1. In The Queen v.
Bryce, 1992 CRIM. L. REv. 728, the Court of Appeal excluded statements allegedly made after
the tape recorder had been turned off.
89. Search Report, supra note 5, at 618.
90. See The Queen v. Leatham, 121 Eng. Rep. 589 (1861).
91. Feldman, supra note 76, at 468 (footnote omitted). Similarly, the editors of the Criminal
Law Review note that "PACE has had a dramatic effect on the number of cases in which admis-
sible evidence is in fact excluded." 1992 CRIM. L. REV. 732.
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§ 76(2) provides for mandatory exclusion of confessions (a) obtained
"by oppression" or (b) likely to have been rendered "unreliable" by
anything said or done (by anyone). "'Oppression' includes torture,
inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of vio-
lence ... .-"92 When oppression is alleged, the burden is on the prose-
cution to rebut the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.93 In addition to
these mandatory bases for exclusion, § 78(1) provides that "the court
may refuse to allow evidence... if it appears... that the admission of
the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it." Finally, § 82(3)
"saves pre-existing common law powers.., to exclude evidence whose
prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value."'94
On the face of it, these bases for exclusion do not seem greatly
different from the old system, though the extension of the "unreliabil-
ity" grounds to things done by people other than the police is a signifi-
cant addition.95 But, by drawing attention to the "oppressiveness" of
police conduct, irrespective of the reliability of the confession, PACE
has clearly directed the judiciary to "police the police." Since PACE
was enacted,
the judges... see themselves as having a disciplinary and regulatory role
in maintaining the balance between the powers of the police and the pro-
tection of suspects. This balance was one of the fundamental elements in
the deliberations of the Phillips Commission and of parliamentarians de-
bating the various versions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill....
In view of the time lavished by Parliament on striking the right balance,
it is not unreasonable or improper for the courts to take the resulting
statute seriously and seek ways of ensuring that the police do so as
well.96
For example, since not all of the rights specified in PACE attach
until after arrest and arrival at the police station,97 the police may be
92. PACE, supra note 26, § 76(8).
93. ZANDER, supra note 75, at 189.
94. Feldman, supra note 76, at 453.
95. Di Birch, The PACE Hots Up: Confessions and Confusion Under the 1984 Act, 1989
CRIM. L. REv. 95, 99-100: "Subsection 2(b) represents a break with the past.,. [A] court's duty
to exclude [now] comes into play wherever anything ma have been 'said or done' to cause the
potentially unreliable confession; it does not matter by whom."
In The Queen v. Harvey, 1988 CRiM. L. REv. 241, for example, the experience of hearing her
lover confess to murder may have been enough to induce a psychopathically disordered woman
of below-normal intelligence to make a false confession in order to protect her lover. Section
76(2)(b) was invoked to exclude her statement.
Accord The Queen v. Brine, 1992 CRIM. L. REv. 122, where the defendant's confession was
excluded on reliability grounds, despite no police misconduct, because it may have been induced
by a "mild form of paranoid psychosis" which would have led the suspect to make untrue
statements.
96. Feldman, supra note 76, at 469 (footnotes omitted).
97. An arrestee does not have to be informed of his rights until after his arrival at the police
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tempted to delay arrest. However, in The Queen v. Ismail, the trial
judge excluded statements made by the defendant where a decision to
delay arrest was intended to evade the protective rules.98 On the other
hand, in The Queen v. Rajakuruna 99, where the suspect was not prop-
erly cautioned that he was a suspect, but "was well aware of [that
fact]" and declined a solicitor, his statements were not excluded.
One area in which the English courts have been particularly pro-
tective of suspects' rights (and have used the exclusionary sanction to
display that concern) is where the police delay access to counsel or
communication with a third party. David Feldman elaborates:
[T]he statutory ground relied on to justify delay must be reasonably sup-
portable by reference to the known facts. Thus the police cannot claim
that an accomplice still at large might be alerted and escape in a case
where the arrest is already public knowledge, as where a detainee was
arrested in public amongst people known to him and his house had al-
ready been searched in the presence of his mother,lc ° or where the sus-
pect's mother had been told of the arrest by telephone hours before the
decision to delay access to a solicitor was taken. 10 1 .. . [T]o delay access
to a solicitor, the police must have reasonable grounds for believing that
the particular solicitor is likely to be dishonest, or is liable to be manipu-
lated or duped into passing on information to a detainee's criminal
confederates. 102
David Wolchover and Anthony Heaton-Armstrong conclude that
"[t]he burden of authority is such that other than in certain categories
of offence it is now virtually impossible for the police to justify the
prevention of access [to a solicitor] at any stage." 10 3
In a similar vein, exclusion has been ordered when the police fail to
fully inform the suspect of his rights, 104 mislead him into thinking that
it is not normal to have legal advice, 105 mislead him and/or his solici-
station. However, the Code forbids any questioning prior to the advice other than in "very
exceptional circumstances." Wolchover & Heaton-Armstrong, supra note 78, at 240; INTRRO-
GATION CODE, supra note 71, para. 11.1.
98. Feldman, supra note 76, at 454 (discussing The Queen v. Ismail, 1990 CRIM. L. REv.
109). Similarly, in The Queen v. Sparks, 1991 CRIM. L. REv. 128, the Court of Appeal held that
a "friendly conversation" about the crime between the suspect and a constable of his acquain-
tance prior to an arrest was an "interview" at which the suspect was entitled to be cautioned and
the police were required to make a record. The court so held despite the fact that the constable
was not purposely trying to evade the requirements of PACE.
99. 1991 CRIM. L. REv. 458. Accord, The Queen v. Dunford, 1991 CRIM. L. REv. 370 and
cases cited in Commentary.
100. Feldman, supra note 76, at 458 (citing The Queen v. Alladice, 87 CRIM. APP. REP. 380
(1988)).
101. Id. (citing The Queen v. Samuel, 1988 Q.B. 615).
102. Id. (citing, inter alia, The Queen v. Davison, 1988 CRIM. L. REv. 442).
103. Wolchover & Heaton-Armstrong, supra note 78, at 234.
104. Feldman, supra note 76, at 455 and cases cited therein.
105. Id.
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tor as to the strength of the evidence in possession of the police, 10 6
obtain a confession that is a result of an earlier, unwarned confes-
sion,107 or fail to make a contemporaneous record of108 (or, after 1991,
tape record)10 9 the interrogation. The attitude of the courts is
summed up by Lord Chief Justice Lane: "If, which we find it hard to
believe, police officers still do not appreciate the importance of
[PACE] and the accompanying Code, then it is time that they did."' 10
Evidentiary exclusions are not limited to violations of the deten-
tion and interrogation rules. In Matto v. Wolverhampton Crown
Court 11I the breath specimen of a suspect was suppressed because of
his earlier, unlawful, arrest. 112 In The Queen v. Gall,113 the Court of
Appeal "quashed a conviction because the trial judge had wrongly re-
fused to exclude evidence of an identification parade [lineup] at which
a police officer had looked into the room where the parade had been
assembled and could have spoken to witnesses before they attempted
to identify the suspect."114 Similarly, in The Queen v. Conway,115 the
Court of Appeal overturned a conviction where no identification
parade had been held, as required by the Code of Practice, and no
reason was shown why a parade was impracticable. 116
In The Queen v. Taylor,117 documentary evidence was suppressed
106. The Queen v. Beales, 1991 CRIM. L. REv. 118 (suspect alone misled by police); accord
The Queen v. Blake, 1991 CRIM. L. Rv. 119; The Queen v. Mason, 3 All E.R. 481 (1987)
(suspect and solicitor misled by police).
107. The Queen v. McGovern, 1991 CRIM. L. REv. 124. Compare Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298 (1985), where, on somewhat similar facts, the United States Supreme Court reached the
opposite result. In McGovern, the first confession was made, in the absence of a solicitor, by an
emotionally upset woman with an IQ of 73. The Court of Appeal held that the absence of the
solicitor was likely to render the first confession unreliable. Since the second confession, though
made with full warnings and in the presence of the solicitor, was the result of the first, it too must
be excluded. The court did not seem to rely on this defendant's peculiar vulnerability, however,
noting that "the very fact" that the first interview was "in breach of the rules" is "likely to have
an effect on the person during the course of a second interview." McGovern, 1991 CRIM. L. REv.
at 125.
108. The Queen v. Canale, 1990 CRIM. L. Rv. 329. See also The Queen v. Scott, 1991
CRIM. L. REv. 56 (where an incriminating statement was suppressed by the Court of Appeal
because the police failed to have the defendant read and sign the record of the interview as
required under para. 12(12)).
109. See Bryce, 1992 CRIM. L. REV. at 728.
110. 1990 CRIM. L. Rav. at 329.
111. 1987 R.T.R. 337 (D.C.).
112. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), for the United States Supreme Court's "taint
of an illegal arrest" doctrine.
113. Cited in Feldman, supra note 76, at 468.
114. Id.
115. 1990 CRIM. L. REv. 402.
116. Accord The Queen v. Britton, 1989 CRIM. L. REv. 144 and cases cited therein.
117. Cited in Feldman, supra note 76, at 468-69 (citing THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 19, 1990, at
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by the trial judge in a case involving financial improprieties, because,
when applying for a subpoena, the police had misled the judge into
believing that the investigation concerned drug trafficking. The evi-
dence was suppressed because of police misconduct, irrespective of any
concerns about reliability.118 In The Queen v. Fennelley,1 19 in a trial
for possession of narcotics with intent to distribute, the trial judge sup-
pressed the narcotics because the suspect was not told the reason why
he was stopped and about to be searched by the police, as required by
PACE § 2(3).120 Finally, in Chapman v. D.P.P.,121 a conviction for
assaulting a police officer was quashed where the police entered the
defendant's apartment in pursuit of a fleeing suspect without reason-
able suspicion that the suspect had committed an arrestable offense.
Given the British courts' long history of ignoring violations by the
police in the evidence gathering process, the developments in exclu-
sionary law since PACE are truly extraordinary. As David Feldman's
analysis and Lord Lane's comments, cited above, suggest, the British
courts have performed this about-face on evidentiary exclusion in part
because the code gives them new authority and in part for the simple
reason that now that the rules are clearly stated, the police can be ex-
pected to obey them.
It is particularly striking that this British "criminal procedure
revolution" is occurring in the context of discretionary, rather than
mandatory, exclusionary rules. The English experience strongly sug-
gests that, if the U.S. rules were clearly stated in statutory form, then
it would be possible to relax somewhat the mandatory exclusionary
rule that has caused so much difficulty in this country. Such a relaxa-
tion would, in turn, make it possible to expand the coverage of the
rules into areas, such as detention and interrogation procedures, where
the U.S. Supreme Court has been unwilling to venture because of the
Court's commitment that any breach of its constitutionally mandated
"rules" must necessarily lead to evidentiary exclusion.
My admiration for PACE is not entirely unqualified. For one
thing, the system of having a statute accompanied by separate, but
frequently duplicative (and extremely prolix), Codes of Practice is
much too complex. 122 Also, as noted above, PACE is sometimes diffi-
118. Id.
119. 1989 CRIM. L. REv. 142.
120. David Feldman points out that Fennelley "might be decided differently under the new
Code, since Fennelley might be held to have consented to the search and so waived his right to be
given the reasons for it." Letter from David Feldman, Professor, University of Bristol, to the
author (Dec. 17, 1991) (on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
121. 1988 CRIM. L. Rav. 843.
122. For an example of the statutory form I would use, see BRADLEY, supra note 15, at ch. 6.
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cult to follow because it incorporates other statutory provisions by ref-
erence. Finally, of course, I do not always agree with PACE as to the
substantive content of individual rules. At the same time, PACE rep-
resents a vast improvement, from the point of view of police, defend-
ants, attorneys, and judges alike, from the previous patchwork quilt of
rules that existed in England, and that continues to exist in the United
States to this day.
AUSTRALIA
12 3
In 1989 1 spent eight months in Canberra, the capital of Australia,
studying the criminal procedure system. Australia, like the United
States, is a vast, English-speaking former British colony, currently
populated by people of diverse ethnic and racial origins. Its legal sys-
tem is drawn from the British common law and it has a federal system
of government much like our own. Moreover, Australians typically
display an antipathy for police at least as strong as that of Americans.
Consequently, a study of Australia's criminal procedure system would
seem to be an ideal source for constructive approaches that might be
useful in the United States.
Unfortunately, current Australian criminal procedure law does not
bear out this expectation. In most respects, it is where U.S. law was in
the mid-fifties, though recent developments augur well for the future.
Until 1991, the "voluntariness" test as to confessions was the only ba-
sis for mandatory evidentiary exclusion; there had been little control
by the High Court over state procedures; and police generally "exer-
cise[d] personal power undisturbed by thoughts that there would ever
be an accounting for its use."124 Moreover, "in a sphere of activity
involving issues of fundamental human liberty the governing rules are
unclear, uncertain, out of date, difficult to find and understand and
thus quite ... unsuitable for the age in which we live." 125
As noted, prior to a 1991 statute, discussed below, there was a
mandatory exclusionary rule only for "involuntary" confessions, and
even they were not automatically excluded in all states. 126 Moreover,
123. The discussion of Australian law found in this section is drawn from Craig M. Bradley,
Criminal Procedure from the "Land of Oz' Lessons for America, 81 1. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 99 (1990).
124. REPORT OF THE BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE ENFORCEMENT OF CRIMINAL LAW IN
QUEENSLAND 91 (1977) (hereinafter LUCAS REPORT).
125. PETER SALLMAN & JOHN WILLIS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AUSTRALIA 20 (1984).
126. In New South Wales, exclusion is also automatic for confessions secured by deliberately
untrue statements. Crimes Act, ch. 410, N.S.W. Stat. 413 (1900) (Austl.). The Australian Capi-
tal Territory does not automatically reject all involuntary confessions; Evidence Act, ch. 68,
Austl. Cap. Terr. Ord. (1971).
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though this mandatory rule has often been mentioned in court opin-
ions, it has rarely been invoked. 127 Beyond this mandatory rule, there
are three possible grounds for discretionary evidentiary exclusion by
the trial judge: 1) that the evidence in question will be unduly prejudi-
cial; 2) that a statement given by the accused appears to be unreliable;
and 3) that the evidence is the product of unfair or unlawful conduct
by the police. 128 Trial judges sometimes use these discretionary bases
of exclusion to exclude confessions deemed unreliable or obtained by
police overreaching. 129
Most Australian states have fairly detailed statutory rules gov-
erning searches and arrests. For example, the New South Wales
Search Warrant Act of 1985 provides for the issuance of search war-
rants to search houses for evidence upon a showing of "reasonable
grounds" and requires that those warrants be specific.130 However,
these rules have not been taken seriously by the police because, until
recently, evidence had never been excluded due to an illegal search in a
reported case,131 though there is ample evidence that illegal, and even
brutal, searches have occurred. 132 This is true despite the fact that, in
the 1978 case of Bunning v. Cross, 133 the High Court expressly broke
from the British common law rule that evidence could never be sup-
pressed due to an illegal search.134
In Bunning, the Court held that, in exercising their discretion to
exclude evidence due to police misconduct, trial judges should con-
sider the following factors: 1) whether the "unlawful or improper con-
duct" on the part of the police was intentional or reckless on the one
hand or merely accidental or "unconscious" on the other; 2) "the ease
with which the law might have been complied with"; 3) "the nature of
the offence charged"; and 4) whether there was evidence that the rule
broken was one which reflected a "deliberate intent on the part of the
legislature narrowly to restrict the police." 135 In Bunning itself, the
Court held that the evidence of a breathalyzer test would be admissible
in a drunk driving case despite the fact that it had been taken without
127. Bradley, supra note 123, at 107.
128. Id. at 107-10.
129. "[Tlhis 'police misconduct' discretion is actually used from time to time, at least in
confession cases, though not with any regularity or consistent logic." Bradley, supra note 123, at
112 and cases discussed therein.
130. Search Warrant Act, chs. 5-6, N.S.W. Stat. (1985) (Austl.).
131. Bradley, supra note 123, at 116.
132. Id. at 119-20.
133. 141 C.L.R. 54 (1978) (Austl.).
134. Id. at 69 (Stephan & Aickin, JJ.)
135. Id. at 80.
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reasonable suspicion and without performing a preliminary roadside
test as required by the statute.136
In the 1990 case of George v. Rockett 1 37 however, the High Court
finally did suppress evidence seized in an unlawful search. In that
case, police in Queensland obtained a search warrant based on a con-
clusory affidavit stating simply that the police had "reasonable
grounds for suspicion" without setting forth the basis therefor. The
High Court, sitting in its capacity as the highest court of the state of
Queensland, ordered that the warrant was invalid and that the evi-
dence must be suppressed. The Court ruled that the Queensland stat-
ute requiring "reasonable grounds" meant that such grounds must be
set forth in the sworn affidavit so that the magistrate could satisfy him-
self that such grounds existed. 138 It seems likely that this holding, and
particularly its repeated insistence that the terms of the statute must
be followed, will lead trial judges to be substantially more receptive to
the possibility of (discretionary) evidentiary exclusion in future cases
involving illegal searches.
In the confessions area, in contrast to searches, no Australian state
has enacted statutory rules governing interrogations, and the law in
this area has been extremely unclear. However, a recently enacted
federal statute, the Crimes (Investigation of Commonwealth Offenses)
Act 1991, will probably provide the basis for improved state proce-
dures as well (if states choose to pass their own statutes using the fed-
eral statute as a model). The new statute provides that federal
arrestees must be brought before a judicial officer within four hours of
arrest, except that in felony cases a judge may extend the detention
period to eight hours.139 This codifies and makes mandatory the hold-
ing of the High Court in the 1986 case of The Queen v. Williams, 140 in
which the High Court upheld the trial judge's exercise of discretion in
excluding the confession of a burglary suspect who had been arrested
at 6:00 a.m. on one day and not taken to the magistrate until 10:00
a.m. the following day. Williams did not mandate exclusion in such a
case; it simply approved the trial judge's discretionary exclusion. The
combined effect of Williams and the statute will undoubtedly result in
more evidentiary exclusions in state courts on this ground than had
previously been the case.
136. Bradley, supra note 123, at 110-11 and citations therein.
137. 64 A.L.J.R. 384 (1990).
138. Id. at 386-87.
139. Parliamentary Research Service, Digest of Crimes (Investigation of Commonwealth Of-
fenses) Amendment Bill 1990 (Now "Act 1991") [hereinafter Digest of Crimes Amendment].
140. 161 C.L.R. 278 (1986) (Austl.).
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The statute goes on to require that a suspect be informed of his
right to communicate with a friend or relative and a lawyer, that he be
allowed reasonable time to do so, and that the police allow the lawyer
to be present during questioning. 141 (This is in addition to the com-
mon law, "Judges' Rules," requirement that the suspect be informed
of his right to silence and that anything he says may be used against
him).142 However, unlike the British and Canadian rules, it is not nec-
essary for the police to inform the suspect of the availability of a Pub-
lic Defender, or that such a person even be available. This statute goes
beyond the U.S. rules by requiring that a person under arrest must be
informed if a friend, relative, or lawyer has sought information about
him; and that the police must provide such information to the party
seeking it unless the arrestee says not to. 143 Finally, all interviews by
federal authorities must be tape recorded unless it is not reasonably
practicable to do so, and, subject to this exception, untaped interviews
are not admissible. 144
In 1991, the High Court put heavy pressure on the states to adopt
the tape recording requirement. In McKinney v. The Queen 145 the
Court, by a vote of 4-3, held that where the (state) prosecutor seeks to
use confessional evidence that is not tape recorded, the trial judge
must warn the jury as to the ease with which the police might fabricate
a statement that is not "reliably corroborated."' 146 In this warning the
court should "emphasize the need for careful scrutiny of the evidence
and direct attention to the fact that police witnesses are often practised
witnesses and it is not an easy matter to determine whether a practised
witness is telling the truth."'147 Thus it seems that the Australian High
Court, distressed by repeated allegations of police "verballing" (i.e.
fabricating confessions), is determined to use whatever means it has at
its disposal to cause the practice to cease. Peter Waight of Australian
National University reports that this case "has had the effect of put-
ting the pressure on all Police Forces to tape/videotape interviews
141. Digest of Crimes Amendment, supra note 139, at 3.
142. Bradley, supra note 123, at 103. Prior to the statute, this "requirement" seems to have
been honored more in the breach than in the observance. See, eg., Van der Meer v. The Queen,
62 A.L.J.R. 656 (1988), where the accused were questioned for eleven hours prior to receiving
the caution and the High Court nevertheless held that an earlier caution was not required..
143. Digest of Crimes Amendment, supra note 139, at 4. Compare Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412 (1986).
144. Digest of Crimes Amendment, supra note 139, at 4.
145. 65 A.L.J.R. 241 (1991).
146. Id. at 243.
147. Id.
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with suspects, and they seem to be doing this generally throughout
Australia."148
In another important 1991 development, the High Court held that
a defendant's silence, either during police interrogation or at trial,
could not be used as evidence against him.149
Recent developments suggest that Australia is moving in the direc-
tion of the modem international trend of having statutory rules gov-
erning the police, backed up by a mixed system of mandatory and
discretionary evidentiary exclusion when the police break the statu-
tory rules. Specifically, Australia is now requiring that the grounds
for searches must be set forth, in advance and in writing, before a
search warrant issues, that arrestees must be fully informed of their
rights before being questioned, that police interrogations must be tape
recorded if they are to be admissible in court, and that silence cannot
be used as evidence against the accused. Finally, the Australian High
Court seems to have only recently recognized the need for a (discre-
tionary) exclusionary remedy to insure that the police follow the rules.
The development of criminal procedural rules in Australia is, how-
ever, constrained by the fact that the Australian constitutional struc-
ture does not permit the federal government to enact a code of
procedure governing the actions of state and local police.
CANADA
The fundamental principles of Canadian criminal procedure law
are set forth in general terms in the 1982 Constitution's Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, which is supplemented by a detailed Code. Per-
taining to police procedures, the Charter states that:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice. 150
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search and
seizure. 151
Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned. 152
Everyone has the right on arrest or detention
148. Letter from Peter Waight, Professor of Law, The Australian National University, to the
author (June 25, 1992) (on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
149. Petty v. The Queen, 65 A.L.J.R. 625 (1991).
In the U.S., a suspect's silence even after he has been arrested (as long as he has not been
given the Miranda warnings) may be used for impeachment purposes. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610 (1976); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603
(1982).
150. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), § 7.
151. Id. § 8.
152. Id. § 9.
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(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor;
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed
of that right;
(c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas
corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.
15 3
Finally, the Charter declares an exclusionary rule:
where . . . a court finds that evidence was obtained in a manner that
infringed or dnied any of the rights or freedoms guaranteed by this
Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having
regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.154
It is certainly interesting to note that in adopting a new Charter of
Rights, the Canadians chose not only to copy the U.S. Fourth Amend-
ment virtually verbatim, but also to adopt, as a constitutional require-
ment, the much maligned exclusionary rule, albeit in a more limited
form.
The current Criminal Code (which is a code of both criminal law
and procedure) was adopted in 1970, and was amended substantially
in 1985.155 It has also been amended in various ways several times
since then. 156 In Canada, all crimes are federal violations, so there is a
single federal code governing the entire country.
Regarding searches, the Code provides for the issuance of a search
warrant when a justice is satisfied by "information on oath" that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that "there [are] in a building, recep-
tacle or place" fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime.
157
Such prior authorization must be obtained "where feasible" 15 8 but
153. Id. § 10.
154. Id. § 24(2). I consider this to be a "discretionary" exclusionary rule in the sense that
exclusion does not follow automatically from the finding of a constitutional violation, as in the
United States. The Canadian Supreme Court, however, insists that § 24(2) "does not confer a
discretion on the [trial] judge but a duty to admit or exclude as a result of his finding [of disre-
pute]." The Queen v. Collins, 33 C.C.C.(3d) 1, 12 (1987). The burden of establishing "disre-
pute," even after a finding of a Charter violation, is on the defendant. Id. at 16. See Yves-Marie
Morissette, The Exclusion of Evidence under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:
What to Do and What Not to Do, 29 MCGILL L.J. 521, 538 (1984) (cited with approval in Collins,
33 C.C.C.(3d) at 17-18).
The decision whether to exclude depends on "all the circumstances," including the nature of
the evidence, what Charter right was violated, whether the violation was serious or technical,
willful or inadvertent, whether it occurred in circumstances of urgency, whether the evidence
would have been obtained in any event, whether the offense was serious, and whether the evi-
dence was essential to substantiate the charge. Collins, 33 C.C.C.(3d) at 18-19.
In Collins, the Supreme Court chose the "lower threshold" French version of the constitu-
tional text "could bring the administration of justice into disrepute," rather than the English
"would bring ...." Id. at 21-22.
155. R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1970); R.S.C., ch. C-46 (1985).
156. R.S.C., ch. 11 (Ist Supp. 1985). See MARTIN'S ANNUAL CRIMINAL CODE CC-1 (1991).
157. MARTIN'S ANNUAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 156, § 487, at CC-539.
158. Id. § 487 ann., at CC-540.
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may be done by radio or telephone. 159 The warrant must be executed
by day unless the justice authorizes night execution. 160 The police do
not need a warrant to search "a person[J vehicle, or place ... other
than a dwelling house," where they have reasonable grounds to believe
that an offense involving a weapon has been committed. 161
Police do not need a warrant to arrest a suspect for "an indictable
offense" (except for certain theft and gambling offenses, for which a
warrant must be used).162 A warrant is not required to enter private
premises to make an arrest,1 63 or to search a vehicle if there are "rea-
sonable grounds for suspicion that the vehicle contains contra-
band." 164  The police may search the person and "immediate
surroundings" of an accused incident to arrest, without any showing
of cause beyond the arrest itself.1 65 Immediately following a search
incident, and prior to execution of a warrant or a consent search, the
suspect must be informed of his rights to withhold consent and to have
counsel. 166
Canadian law thus adopts a somewhat more police-oriented
approach to searches than does U.S. law, allowing warrantless
searches for offenses involving weapons, and warrantless entries to
arrest (though, as noted, the Canadian consent search rules are
stricter.) 167 By contrast, Canadian law imposes, in some ways, stricter
limitations on police interrogation than does U.S. law.
Upon "arrest or detention," the suspect must be informed of his
right to counsel. "The police must refrain from attempting to elicit
159. Id. § 487.1(1), at CC-550.
160. Id. § 488, at CC-553.
161. Id. § 101(1), at CC-108.
162. Id. § 495, at CC-565.
163. Id. § 495 ann., at CC-568.
164. Id. ann., at CH-15 to CH-16 and cases cited therein. This limitation of vehicle searches
to "contraband" rather than all evidence of a crime, appears only in the Annotation, not the
Code itself, and apparently simply reflects the holding of a particular case. There is no reason to
suppose that, if confronted with the case, the Canadian courts would not extend vehicle searches
to other evidence as well.
165. Id. § 495 ann., at CC-568.
166. Id. § 495 ann., at CC-568 to CC-569. Failure to inform the accused of his right to
counsel prior to a consent search is likely to render the search unreasonable under § 8 of the
Charter. Id. at CH-16. Violation of the right to counsel in other search contexts is not. Id.
Accord S. HUTCHINSON AND J. MORTON, SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW IN CANADA 7-2 (1991).
In the United States, by contrast, a suspect need not be informed of his right to withhold
consent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973).
167. Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized over twenty exceptions to
the warrant requirement, searches in cases involving weapons are not among them. See Craig M.
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1474 (1985). In Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court held that an arrest warrant was required to arrest
someone in his home.
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evidence from the detainee until he has a reasonable opportunity to
retain and instruct counsel." 168 "[D]etainees must be informed... of
the existence and availability of the applicable systems of duty counsel
and legal aid in the jurisdiction ... -"169 "Detention" occurs when the
person "submits or acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and reason-
ably believes the choice to do otherwise does not exist."' 170 Once
again, the U.S. Justice Department's claim that "there is no required
offer of appointed counsel for suspects who cannot retain counsel and
no right to refuse to be questioned"1 71 is incorrect on both counts,
though the issue was not clearly settled in 1986 when the Justice De-
partment report was issued.
In one case "detention" occurred, and the warnings were required,
when an accused was "ushered into an interview room by customs
officers who suspected he was carrying narcotics. 1 72 However, unlike
the Edwards rule in the United States, the Canadian rules do not give
the defendant any right to have counsel present during questioning
(after consultation has been allowed). The Canadian Supreme Court
has specifically invited police to attempt to "persuade" a counseled
suspect to confess, "short of denying the suspect the right to choose or
depriving him of an operating mind." 173
Canadian police normally give the British Judges'- Rules cautions
as to the right to silence and "whatever you say may be given in evi-
dence," which appear on the standard form issued to police.174 In the
1990 case of The Queen v. Hebert,1 75 the Supreme Court of Canada
assumed that the right to silence included a warning as to that right,
holding that "the most important function of legal advice upon deten-
tion is to ensure that the accused understands his rights, chief among
which is his right to silence." 176 The Court went on to hold that, after
a suspect had asserted his right to silence, an incriminating statement
coaxed from the suspect by a policeman posing as a fellow prisoner
must be excluded. (The Court further observed that statements made
168. MARTIN'S ANNUAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 156, at CH-21 and cases cited therein.
169. Id.
170. Id. at CH-19. Thus, traffic stops constitute "detention," but the warnings are still not
required if provincial legisation authorizing such stops allows them without warnings. Such leg-
islation has been held to be a "reasonable limit prescribed by law under § 1 of the Charter." Id.
171. Interrogation Report, supra note 5, at 537.
172. MARTIN'S ANNUAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 156, at CH-20 and cases cited therein.
173. The Queen v. Hebert, 77 C.R.(3d) 145, 147, 57 C.C.C.(3d) 1 (1990).
174. See, eg., The Queen v. Manninen, 58 C.R.(3d) 97, 100 (1987).
175. 77 C.R.(3d) 145.
176. Id. at 146.
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to passive undercover agents, to real prisoners who are not police
agents, or overheard by a listening device would still be admissible. 17 7)
Thus Canada, like England, exceeds U.S. standards by requiring
that the police inform detainees as to the availability of free counsel;
and tries to ensure that detainees actually receive counsel when they
ask for it, rather than simply mandating that questioning must
cease. 178 Moreover, Canada requires the warnings at the onset of any
arrest or detention (subject to the traffic stop exception discussed
above), rather than prior to custodial interrogations only.179 How-
ever, neither Canada nor England has the equivalent of our rule for-
bidding questioning of a suspect after he has counsel.180
As noted above, the Charter sets forth a discretionary exclusionary
rule, to be exercised when admission of the evidence would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. The Supreme Court of Can-
ada, in Collins v. The Queen,' 81 held that this exclusionary authority
shbuld "rarely" be applied to real (i.e., physical as opposed to testimo-
nial) evidence, but did order exclusion in that case where the police
had applied a chokehold on the subject of a search for narcotics. The
Court emphasized that the purpose of the rule was not to discipline
the police, but to avoid "disrepute" as the Charter requires. In The
Queen v. Dyment,182 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction, on the
grounds of unreasonable search, where a doctor at the hospital at
which the suspect was being treated after an automobile accident col-
lected a sample of free-flowing blood from the suspect, without a war-
rant or consent. The blood was used to prove drunk driving. The
Court noted that "a violation of the sanctity of a person's body is
much more serious than that of his office or even of his home."18 3
The 1989 case of Genest v. The Queen 18 4 is of particular interest.
177. Id. at 147. In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
statements voluntarily made to "jail plants" by incarcerated suspects are admissible, even though
suspects are not given Miranda warnings. Where the suspect does not know he is speaking to a
law enforcement officer, he is not undergoing "custodial interrogation" within the meaning of
Miranda.
178. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
179. Compare United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984), where the Court held that
prisoners, held in administrative detention for up to 19 months during the investigation of the
murder of fellow inmates, were not entitled to counsel.
180. See discussion, supra note 81.
181. 33 C.C.C.(3d) 1 (1987).
182. 66 C.R.(3d) 348 (1988).
183. Id. at 367 (quoting Pohoretsky v. The Queen, 58 C.R.(3d) 113, 116 (1987), a case where
the same result was reached on similar facts). Cf Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966),
allowing the warrantless extraction of blood from a drunk driving suspect under an "exigent
circumstance" rationale.
184. 67 C.R.(3d) 224 (1989).
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In that case the police, acting pursuant to a warrant that was defective
in that, inter alia, it did not specify the objects to be searched for,
made an illegal no-knock entry into the suspect's house. The Court
ruled the search unreasonable and suppressed the evidence. Though
admission of the evidence did not render the trial unfair, the non-tech-
nical defects in the warrant and its execution were such that use of the
evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.1 85
Despite the claims of the Canadian Supreme Court that the purpose of
exclusion is not to discipline the police, this case seems to have that
impact. Similarly, in Kokesch v. The Queen, 186 the Supreme Court
suppressed marijuana, by a 4-3 vote, because of a trespass onto the
curtilage of the suspect's property which provided grounds (inter alia,
the odor of marijuana) for a search warrant.18 7 Because the conduct
of the police constituted a violation of clear statutory rules, the major-
ity deemed it "egregious" despite the lack of any bad faith or physical
force by the police.
The Canadian courts are much stricter when it comes to breaches
of the interrogation requirements. The reasoning is that
where, after a violation of the Charter, the accused is conscripted against
himself through a confession or other evidence emanating from him[,
t]he use of such evidence would render the trial unfair, for it did not exist
prior to the violation and it strikes at one of the fundamental tenets of a
fair trial, the right against self-incrimination. 188
This distinction seems strange unless it is really based on reliability
concerns. Why admit evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
but exclude evidence obtained by a no more unreasonable interroga-
tion technique?189 This would seem to be justified only if the latter
evidence is suspected of being unreliable. However, the Supreme
Court of Canada has not adopted this reason for the distinction. Nor
is it obvious that the right to silence is a more important right than
that of the sanctity of the home. Whatever the reason, this distinction
185. Id. at 225 (English digest of case which is reported in French).
186. 1 C.R.(4th) 62 (1990).
187. But see The Queen v. DeBot, 73 C.R.(3d) 129 (1989), for a recent case in which evi-
dence found during a frisk was not suppressed by the Supreme Court, despite the police's failure
to advise the accused of his right to counsel prior to the frisk. As Justice Sopinka pointed out,
concurring in the result, it would be an empty gesture to inform the accused of his right to
counsel, since the majority concluded that it was not necessary for the police to suspend the
search if the accused invoked that right. Id. at 158.
188. Collins, 56 C.R.(3d) 193, 211 (1987). See also R. E. SALHANY, CANADIAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 69-70 (5th ed. 1989).
189. See, e.g., The Queen v. Meddoui 2 C.R.(4th) 316 (1990), where the Alberta Court of
Appeal excluded evidence found as a result of an illegal search. "[A]ny attempt to draw a line
around Charter protection based upon personal involvement of the accused is bound to produce
curious, even absurd, results." Id. at 336.
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is the stated basis for a tough-minded attitude by the Supreme Court
toward police violations in the confessions area.
For example, in The Queen v. Manninen,190 the Supreme Court
upheld a lower court's reversal of a conviction of a suspect who, after
being informed of his rights to silence and to counsel, stated: "I ain't
saying anything until I see my lawyer."' 191 The police then questioned
him further, inducing an incriminating response. The Court held that
§ 10(b) of the Charter of Rights imposes a duty on police to afford
suspects a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel, and "to cease
questioning or otherwise attempting to elicit evidence from the de-
tainee until he has had a reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct
counsel."' 92 Violation of this principle should lead to evidentiary
exclusion.
In The Queen v. Black,193 the suspect, arrested for attempted mur-
der, asked for a lawyer when originally questioned and talked to her
lawyer on the telephone. Later, when the victim of the suspect's knife
attack died and the case became a murder investigation, the suspect
was again informed of her right to counsel and again asked to speak
with her lawyer. The police tried several times to contact her lawyer
but were unsuccessful; the suspect refused to try to contact another
lawyer. When the police then questioned her about the crime, she
confessed and led them to the knife. The Supreme Court excluded the
confession, and the circumstances under which the knife was found,
but not the knife itself, for the same reason as in Manninen. 9 4
In Amyot v. The Queen, 9 5 the suspect was given the appropriate
warnings and was asked to submit to a polygraph exam. Without con-
sulting his lawyer, he agreed to do so. After the test, he was informed
that he had failed and, after further discussion, he made an incriminat-
ing declaration. The Quebec Court of Appeal reversed the conviction
and ordered the statement suppressed, holding that the questioning of
190. 58 C.R.(3d) 97 (1987).
191. Id. at 100.
192. Id. at 104. Cf Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), to the same effect. See also
The Queen v. Duguay, 67 C.R.(3d) 252 (1987), where the Canadian Supreme Court suppressed
physical evidence that was the fruit of a statement given when the accused had been interrogated
without having been informed of his right to counsel.
193. 70 C.R.(3d) 97 (1989).
194. Id. at 117. The Court also observed that "the knife would undoubtedly have been un-
covered by the police in the absence of the Charter breach .... " Id. The fact that the Court felt
it necessary to invoke this "inevitable discovery" rationale casts further doubt on the firmness of
the Court's resolve to admit real evidence absent unusual circumstances. Cf Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298 (1985), similarly refusing to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to
Miranda violations.
195. 78 C.R.(3d) 129 (1990).
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the suspect by the polygraphist after the suspect was told that he had
failed was a "breach of trust... an example of intimidation, coercion,
and undue pressure." 196 In addition, this was a breach of the suspect's
right to counsel because he was not rewarned after he became a
suspect.
Finally, in The Queen v. Leclair,197 a lineup identification was sup-
pressed by the Supreme Court when the accused was forced to partici-
pate without having been informed of his opportunity to consult with
counsel (who could have told him that he had no legal obligation to
appear in the lineup). The Court held that this was evidence "emanat-
ing from" the accused, as discussed in Collins.198
The Canadian system is, in a sense, the mirror image of the Ameri-
can. Whereas in the United States, the rules are muddled but the ex-
clusionary formula is clear (i.e., if the rules have been broken the
evidence is always excluded' 99), in Canada, the rules are relatively
clear (at least in those areas of the law where there are codified rules),
but the exclusionary requirement is, intentionally, unclear. The deci-
sion whether or not to exclude is left to the trial court. Unlike in
France and Australia, however, the discretionary exclusionary rule is
regularly invoked; and although its purpose may not be to deter police
misconduct, it nevertheless surely has that effect.
The Canadian Code itself tends to be written in more technical
language than the British PACE. Consequently, it is a less useful
model for emulation by the United States. More troublesome yet, it is
not comprehensive. Instead, the Canadian system is a cross between
the U.S. and British systems; the Canadian Code spells out some
things, such as search warrant requirements, 2°° while leaving other
matters, such as searches incident to arrest, to be governed by judicial
interpretation of the Charter.20 1 Thus Canada is of interest not be-
cause of its particular code, but because it accepts, at least in part, the
principles that a code is the proper way to make rules; that rules can
be developed in advance, rather than case-by-case; and that a discre-
196. Id. at 129-30 (English digest of opinion in French).
197. 67 C.R.(3d) 209 (1989). Compare Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1972), finding
no right to counsel at pre-indictment lineups. For an excellent comparative analysis of Canadian
and U.S. criminal procedure, see Robert Harvie & Hamar Foster, Ties that Bind? The Supreme
Court of Canada, American Jurisprudence and the Revision of Canadian Criminal Law Under the
Charter, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 729 (1990).
198. Leclair, 67 C.R.(3d), annex at 211.
199. Well, almost always. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule in search warrant cases); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987)
(reliance on statute later declared unconstitutional held not to mandate exclusion).
200. MARTIN'S ANNUAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 156, § 487 at CC-539-40.
201. See id. § 495, Search Incident to Arrest at CC-568.
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tionary, but frequently applied, exclusionary rule is the appropriate
check on police misbehavior.
FRANCE
French law recognizes three levels of crime: felonies, punishable
by five or more years imprisonment; delicts, punishable by two months
to five years imprisonment; and contraventions, punishable by no
more than two months imprisonment .202A "flagrant" felony or delict
is one that is in the process of being committed or has recently been
committed.20 3 In such "flagrant" cases, the Code permits the authori-
ties to: (1) search the scene of the offense and seize any evidence found
there;204 (2) search the domicile of all persons who appear to have
participated in the offense or to be in possession of evidence, and seize
any evidence "useful to the manifestation of the truth"; 20 5 (3) desig-
nate experts to conduct scientific or technical examinations;20 6 (4) de-
tain persons on the scene until completion of the investigation;20 7 (5)
summon (by force, if necessary) and interrogate (not under oath) any
persons capable of furnishing evidence;208 and (6) place witnesses and
suspects in investigatory detention for up to twenty-four hours (which
can be extended to forty-eight hours with the approval of the prosecut-
ing attorney).20 9
These search and detention powers are subject to a number of pro-
cedural safeguards. For example, house searches must respect profes-
sional secrets and the "rights of the defense" and must be witnessed by
persons independent of the searching authorities. 210 Investigatory de-
tention reports must include the dates and times of interrogation, rest,
and release, and document that the detainee was advised of his right to
a medical examination.2 1 1 On the other hand, there is apparently no
particular legal standard (analogous to common law probable cause)
governing where an officer may look for evidence of the offense.212
202. Richard S. Frase, Introduction to THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE I
(rev. ed. 1988) [hereinafter Introduction].
203. CODE DE PROCADURE PfNALE [C. PR. PfN.] art. 53 (Fr.).
204. Id. art. 54.
205. Id. art. 56.
206. Id. art. 60.
207. Id. art. 61.
208. Id. art. 62.
209. Id. art. 63.
210. Id. art. 57.
211. Id. art. 64.
212. But, as discussed below, searches of domiciles may not be undertaken on mere
suspicion.
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Nor is there any right to counsel (or even a right to silence warning)
during investigatory detentions or at pre-trial lineups.213 Moreover,
violation of the durational or other limitations on such detentions has
not been found to require exclusion of the resulting confession
2 14 (but
violations of the rights of defense in other contexts may lead to
exclusion 215).
In the absence of a "flagrant" offense, the investigation is, in the-
ory, conducted by an independent magistrate (juge d'instruction); with
the police relegated to conducting only a preliminary, noncoercive, in-
vestigation in which searches for and seizures of evidence may only be
performed upon written consent of the party affected, and detention
for interrogation is not allowed.216 However, Professor Weigend re-
ports that in one year, only 14% of eligible cases were referred to the
magistrate. In the other cases, the police were able to obtain "volun-
tary" cooperation from the suspect, because people were unaware of
their rights or "hesitant to refuse to answer questions or otherwise
obstruct police investigations, lest they create or augment suspicion
against themselves. ' 21 7 Magistrates have broad discretion in investi-
gations to order arrests and detentions and to carry out "all acts of
investigation [including electronic surveillance] that they deem useful
to the manifestation of the truth. '218 Furthermore, magistrates may,
and frequently do, delegate their investigatory authority back to the
police2 19 (not including their power to issue arrest warrants or to inter-
rogate suspects220).
213. Richard S. Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform:
How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REv.
539, 585 (1990).
214. Frase, supra note 202, at 10.
215. Id. at 16 n.105. In particular, "violations of the provisions of Articles 63 and 64, gov-
erning investigatory detention, might lead to exclusion if it were shown that 'the search for truth
was fundamentally tainted."' Id.
216. C. PR. PtN. art. 77. However, if the suspect appears "voluntarily" at the police station,
or is already there for some other reason, he can be placed in investigatory detention for twenty-
four or forty-eight hours as with "flagrant" offenses. Frase, supra note 202, at 11. "Discreet
allusion to the possibility of [such detention] appears often to induce garrulity in suspects and
witnesses." Thomas Weigend, Continental Cures for American Ailments, in 2 CRIME AND JUS-
TICE: AN ANNUAL REvIEW OF RESEARCH 381, 391 (Norval Morris & Michael Tonry eds.,
1980).
217. Weigend, supra note 216, at 391. See also ROGER MERLE & ANDRt Vrru, TRAITA DE
DRorr CRIMINEL 263-64 (2d ed. 1973).
218. C. PR. PPN. arts. 81(1), 82(1). Electronic surveillance is now regulated more closely by a
law which limits the duration of, and places other restrictions on, electronic surveillance. Act of
July 10, 1991, Law No. 91-646, 162 J.O. 9167, 9 A.L.D. 308.
219. C. PR. PCN. art. 151.
220. Frase, supra note 202, at 15.
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At interrogations conducted by an independent examining magis-
trate, the accused must be informed of his rights to counsel and to
silence.221 Failure to warn in these cases will generally result in exclu-
sion of any statement, but not necessarily of its fruits.222
Finally, French law provides for identity checks, at which people
are required to produce their identification papers. These checks need
not be based on individualized suspicion, need not require any suspi-
cion of danger for a weapons frisk, and can last up to four hours.223
Even these lenient rules are often ignored because, as Walter
Pakter reports, they are not generally backed up with an exclusionary
sanction:
French police frequently disregard Code provisions concerning the pre-
conditions and duration of the garde d vue [detention for interrogation].
Most scholars have urged that courts use exclusion for Code violations;
however, the Court of Cassation has consistently limited relief to individ-
ual criminal and civil actions against the police. This relief is illusory
because penal sanctions for police violence have been restrictively inter-
preted by the courts. Futhermore, actions against the police are time
consuming, expensive, and difficult to prosecute.... Administrative con-
trols within the police department, such as promotion incentives, may
prevent gross abuses of detainees. Nevertheless, the primary concern of
the police is to solve crimes, and they are unlikely to pay more attention
to civil liberties than the courts.... [D]etainees in France are generally
treated far worse than suspects held by United States or German police
interrogators.224
The Code's very limited restrictions on searches, such as the provi-
sions that searches of attorneys' offices may only be carried out by a
magistrate225 and that searches may not generally be carried out at
night,226 are enforced by mandatory exclusion.227 Other violations
lead to exclusion only if they violate substantial provisions of the
Code, in particular the rights of the defense.228
221. C. PR. PtN. art. 114.
222. Id. arts. 170(1), 172(2).
223. C. PR. PfN. arts. 78-2, 78-3.
224. Walter Pakter, Exclusionary Rules in France, Germany and Italy, 9 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1985). See also Frase, supra note 213, at 586: "[A]Ithough some Amer-
ican observers have suggested that French rights are effectively enforced by means of administra-
tive discipline, the French themselves are skeptical of such remedies: 'experience proves that the
sole ordinary sanction is exclusion.'" (citations omitted).
225. C. PR. PfN. art. 56-1.
226. Id. art. 59(1).
227. Id. art. 59(3), which provides that "The formalities mentioned in Articles 56, 57 and the
present article are proscribed upon pain of nullity." See also id. art. 78-3(11), providing for
mandatory exclusion as to the limitations on detention for the purpose of identity checks.
228. Id. art. 172(1). This article relates to violations concerning judicial investigation. For
violations in other areas, see Judgment of Mar. 17, 1960 (Kissari), 1960 Bull. Crim., No. 156
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In 1980, the Court of Cassation ordered the exclusion of a confes-
sion which had been obtained following a warrantless search based on
mere suspicion. This indicated that searches and seizures could not be
conducted, absent consent, on the basis of mere suspicion or post-
search evidence. 229 The Court of Cassation has reaffirmed the exclu-
sion of evidence obtained in illegal searches and seizures, and lower
courts have excluded such evidence despite the fact that violations of
the Code were made in good faith.230 The Court has also implied that
evidence obtained by way of unauthorized wiretaps would be
excluded. 231
France has a much more homogeneous population than the United
States, and a nationally organized police force.232 Consequently, it
seems to manage with a loosely structured criminal procedure system.
The French Code of Criminal Procedure dates back to 1958, though it
has been amended since. Whether French procedures are acceptable
for France is difficult to say, although many French authorities think
they are not.233 These procedures are clearly not in keeping with the
modem international trend of a detailed code of police procedure
backed up by a discretionary, but frequently invoked, exclusionary
rule to ensure that the police follow the rules. However, France is ad-
dressing reforms of criminal procedure, and a semi-official commission
recommended major reforms in a 1991 report. 234
GERMANY
The German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung)
was introduced in 1877, and most recently repromulgated in 1975.235
(Fr.). See generally Edward A. Tomlinson, Non-Adversarial Justice: The French Experience, 42
MD. L. REV. 131, 166-71 (1983) (also discussing the concept of "the rights of the defense").
229. Judgment of May 30, 1980 (Gomez-Garzon), Cass. crim., 1980 Bull. Crim., No. 5, at
412 (The police search was conducted because of a suspicion of the presence of drugs. The
search had uncovered stolen watches and the defendant had later confessed to cocaine use.).
230. See Pakter, supra note 224, at 37 n.266.
231. Judgment of Oct. 9, 1980 (Tournet), Cass. crim., 1980 Bull. Crim., No. 8, at 662 (hold-
ing proper the use of an authorized wiretap as long as it was executed under the control of the
magistrate, without trickery or strategem, and without compromising the defendant's rights).
232. Frase, supra note 213, at 554-57. "The French police are organized in two nationwide
hierarchies: the National Police under the Minister of the Interior, and the Gendarmes, under
the Minister of Defense." Id. at 554.
233. See ROGER MERLE & ANDRt VITU, TRAIT DE DROIT CRIMINEL: PROCEDURE
PtNALE § 1272, at 541 n.2 (3d ed. 1979); J.C. SOYER, MANUEL DE DROIT PfNAL ET PROCE-
DURE P.NALE 285 (6th ed. 1984); J. PRADEL, PROCEDURE PftNALE 464 (3d ed. 1985).
234. Commission Justice P6nale et Droits de l'Homme, La Mise en Etat des Affaires Pnales,
Rapports (1991).
235. Letter from Thomas Weigend, Professor, University of Cologne, to the author (Jan. 8,
1992) (on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
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It is more detailed, and places more restrictions on the police, than the
French code, but it is relatively undemanding by modem standards.236
For example, the dwelling and person of anyone "suspected" of a
crime may be searched by the police "for the purpose of apprehending
such person or if it may be presumed that such search will lead to the
discovery of evidence. ' 237 Although Article 13 of the German Consti-
tution (Grundgesetz) provides that searches may be ordered only by a
judge, that article and the Code permit searches to be ordered "by the
prosecution and its auxiliary officials [the police]" if there is "danger
in delay. ' 238 Under the Code, search warrants need not be in any
particular form, need not be grounded on probable cause or any par-
ticular evidentiary showing (merely some "suspicion"), 239 and may be
given orally, or simply dispensed with, if there is danger in delay.
However, in a dramatic (by German standards) new development,
the Constitutional (highest) Court has interpreted the Constitution to
require more. To search the home of a suspect, the Code, as noted,
requires only mere suspicion (verddchtig).240 This is in contrast to
searches of the homes of third persons, in which case a higher stan-
dard (which sounds like our probable cause), "facts upon which it may
be concluded" that evidence may be found, must be set forth.241 In
the Decision of September 3, 1991,242 however, the Constitutional
Court rejected a warrant that simply declared that the police wanted
to search the suspect's home "on suspicion of murder" 243 without set-
ting forth the grounds for the suspicion, and ordered the evidence to
be excluded. (This was a typical warrant application prior to this
time.244) The Court declared that this warrant violated the constitu-
tional protection of the "free development of the personality," 245 as
236. See generally Bradley, supra note 5 (from which much of the discussion in this section is
drawn).
237. Id. at 1038 (quoting Strafprozessordnung [StPO] § 102 (F.R.G.)).
238. StPO § 105. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 13(2) (F.R.G.). In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court held that permitting a State Attorney General to
issue search warrants even in cases where he later served as chief prosecutor violated the require-
ment that the magistrate issuing the warrant be "neutral and detached" as required by the
Constitution.
239. The translator of the German Code of Criminal Procedure specifically notes that "un-
qualified suspicion suffices for a search, the word 'reasonable' is not added by the legislature." 10
THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, THE GERMAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE § 102 & n.1 (Horst Niebler trans. 1965).
240. StPO § 102.
241. StPO § 103.
242. 1992 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 60 (F.R.G.).
243. Id.
244. Conversation with Professor Wagner, University of Kiel (June 16, 1992).
245. GG art 2:
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well as Article 13, discussed above. Specifically, the warrant was de-
fective in that it did not set forth details of the offense suspected (in
particular that the police were also investigating immigration viola-
tions),246 and did not specify the nature of the evidence to be sought or
define the areas to be searched narrowly enough. 247 This level of detail
is necessary so that the magistrate can make an independent judgment
as to whether the intrusion into the suspect's "private sphere" occa-
sioned by the search and seizure is proportional to the crime
suspected. 248
While the decision stops short of requiring more than mere suspi-
cion to justify a search, it implies that something more akin to the
factual showing required to search non-suspects is now required.
Anything less would, in the usual case, make it difficult for the magis-
trate to make an "independent" judgment declaring the search consis-
tent with the constitutional principle of proportionality. Moreover,
since the Constitutional Court excluded the evidence in this case, it
demonstrated its willingness to back up its pronouncements with
meaningful remedies. This is in contrast to the frequent past practice
of declaring a search illegal but then admitting the evidence
anyway. 249
In addition to this recent development, the German Constitution
imposes other restrictions on the criminal justice system:
"[It] affords a fair trial before a legally appointed and independent judge
in which constitutional guarantees are observed; specifically the dignity
of the person, the right to free development of the personality, the free-
dom of the person, equality before the law... as well as the prohibition
against inhumane treatment. 250
The Rechtsstaatsprinzip (principle of a just state - similar to the
U.S. due process requirement) forbids police brutality and deceit both
(1) Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality ....
(2) Everyone shall have the right to life and to inviolability of his person ....
246. This is particularly important under German law. If the magistrate were to determine
that the only substantiated basis for the search was evidence concerning immigration violations
rather than murder, then he might decide not to issue the warrant under the constitutional Prin-
ciple of Proportionality, even though he would have issued it for a murder investigation. See
Bradley, supra note 5, at 1041.
247. Decision of Sept. 3, 1991, 1992 BVerfGE at 61.
248. Id.
249. See Bradley, supra note 5, at 1040-41, 1046, describing the German law as of 1983. At
that time, searches could be performed on mere "suspicion," rather than probable cause, and a
written search warrant was frequently not used at all. Most significantly, violation of a search
order requirement or failure to provide the required information often did not lead to the exclu-
sion of evidence derived from the search.
250. THEODOR KLEINKNECHT & KARLHEINZ MEYER, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG Einleitung
para. 19 (40th ed. 1991) (citations omitted).
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in the seizure of evidence25i and in interrogations.25 2 Although evi-
dence must be excluded if the seizure itself was in violation of the
Rechtsstaatsprinzip,253 regardless of its probative value or the serious-
ness of the crime under investigation, 254 the practical effect of this
broad exclusion has been limited by the fact that the German courts
have analyzed searches and seizures separately. Thus, in a case in
which a search order violated the Rechtsstaatsprinzip because it failed
to specify the crime being investigated and the evidence sought, this
constitutional defect alone did not lead to suppression of the evidence
seized pursuant to the order.255 Instead, the seizure was evaluated in-
dependently of the illegal search to determine whether it had been ac-
complished through brutality or deceit. 256 The court reasoned that
the question of the validity of the search itself was not properly
presented,257 because the seizure was the actual source of the evi-
dence.258 As a result, unconstitutional seizures (i.e. seizures achieved
through brutality or deceit) will lead directly to suppression,259
251. Judgment of Mar. 17, 1971, 24 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen[BGHSt] 125, 131 (F.R.G.) (decisions of the federal appeals court panel for criminal cases).
252. The rules forbidding brutality and deceit in interrogation are statutory, see StPO § 136a,
but the statute in turn rests on constitutional principles. Bradley, supra note 5, at 1049-50.
253. KLEINKNECHT & MEYER, supra note 250, Einleitung para. 54.
254. Id.; cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (excluding brutally seized evidence on
due process grounds in a decision preceding extension of the exclusionary rule to the states).
255. See Judgment of May 24, 1977, 44 BVerfGE 353.
256. Id. at 371-72; see also Bradley, supra note 5, at 1406. In this case, the seizure was held
unconstitutional for essentially the same reason for which the search was held unconstitutional:
the police were not investigating a specific crime, and a "fishing expedition" could not justify an
action as intrusive as the seizure of the private medical records of a drug rehabilitation clinic. If,
however, the police had found illegal narcotics rather than merely medical records, it is likely
that the evidence would not have been suppressed, despite the defects in the search; in deciding in
favor of exclusion, the court placed great emphasis on the private nature of the evidence seized.
257. Accord Judgment of May 26, 1976, 42 BVerfGE 212, 218. In this earlier case, the court
did not conclude that it would never exclude evidence on the basis of an illegal search, but found
that the issue was not ripe.
258. See Judgment of May 24, 1977, 44 BVerfGE 353, 383-84. In view of the fact that the
German Constitution guarantees the inviolability of the home - GG art. 13; see Judgment of
May 26, 1976, 42 BVerfGE at 219 - this distinction makes little sense. Breaking down the door
of a house to find evidence is certainly as serious an intrusion as snatching the evidence from the
defendant's hand. Because the German system provides alternate grounds to exclude evidence,
however, this distinction does not create as much mischief in Germany as it might in the United
States. This point is illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128 (1954). When police broke into the defendant's home and installed a microphone, the Court
condemned the police behavior as a flagrant violation of the Fourth Amendment, id. at 132, but
declined to exclude the evidence (the conversations of the occupants), because the Court had not
yet held the exclusionary rule applicable to the states. Id. at 132-34; see Wolf v. Colorado, 228
U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 665 (1961). In Germany, the courts
would have no difficulty excluding such evidence, not because of illegal police behavior, but
because private conversations in the home generally are not admissible, however obtained. See
generally Bradley, supra note 5, at 1044-46 (discussing the tape recording case).
259. Judgment of May 24, 1977, 44 BVerfGE at 383-84.
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whereas unconstitutional searches and merely illegal seizures (those
that violate the rules of criminal procedure) will not necessarily have
that effect. 60
However, as noted above, the Decision of September 3, 1991 seems
to be changing the German approach and mandating exclusion as a
remedy for police misconduct for either search or seizure violations,
though the Court did not directly address this issue in the opinion. In
that case, exclusion was ordered even though the seizure was not ac-
complished by brutality or deceit, but rather, involved a defective
search warrant.
The second relevant constitutional principle is that of Verhdltnis-
md'sigkeit (principle of proportionality). 261 Under this doctrine, the
methods used in fighting crime must be proportional to the "serious-
ness of the offense and the strength of the suspicion" 262 as well as to
the constitutional interests at stake. Thus, what would be appropriate
in some cases may not be justifiable in others. The courts also employ
a form of "least drastic means" analysis when assessing police actions
under the principle of proportionality: if less intrusive measures will
suffice, a greater intrusion will not be permitted. 263 This approach is
illustrated by the Federal Constitutional Court's Judgment of June 10,
1963,264 in which the taking of spinal fluid from a suspect to determine
his possible insanity, though generally authorized by the Code of
Criminal Procedure,2 65 was held to be out of proportion to the misde-
meanor charge against the suspect.2 66 The warrant application in the
260. Thus a night search that is prohibited by StPO § 104, for example, can nevertheless
yield admissible evidence unless use of that evidence would violate the principle of proportional-
ity. See Bradley, supra note 5, at 1041.
261. Although the principle of proportionality is also considered to be a component of the
Rechtsstaatsprinzip, see KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZUGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEtJrSCHLAND 77 (12th ed. 1980), in the German decisions it is usually dis-
cussed as a separate principle.
262. KLEINKNECHT & MEYER, supra note 250, Einleitung para. 20.
263. Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966, 20 BVerfGE 162, 187; see also James G. Carr, Wiretapping
in West Germany, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 607 (1981) (discussing application of this doctrine in
wiretapping cases).
264. 16 BVerfGE 194.
265. "A physical examination of the accused may be ordered for the ascertainment of facts
which are important for the proceeding. For this purpose the taking of blood samples and otherpenetrations of the body, made by a physician pursuant to the rules of medical science ... are
permissible without the consent of the accused, provided no resulting detriment to his health is to
be feared." StPO § 81a.
266. Judgment of June 10, 1963, 16 BVerfGE at 202. Because this case arose on appeal from
the order authorizing examination, the evidence was never obtained, and the question of suppres-
sion was not directly addressed. See also Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966, 20 BVerfGE 162, 187 (hold-ing that search of a press room requires a higher standard of cause than do other searches; such a
search "must promise success in producing appropriate evidence," rather than be grounded on
mere suspicion).
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1991 case was also held to violate the Principle of Proportionality be-
cause it did not give the magistrate sufficient information to determine
whether the search was a proportional measure in that case.267
German courts therefore engage in a two-step analysis when ad-
dressing constitutionally-based challenges to the use of evidence.
First, the court determines whether the evidence at issue was seized or
obtained in violation of the Rechtsstaatsprinzip. In cases in which
there is a violation, the judiciary must exclude the evidence to preserve
the purity of the judicial process (Reinheit des Verfahrens).268 If the
evidence is not excluded in the first step, the court then considers the
principle of Verhdltnismdssigkeit (proportionality). Weighing the ap-
propriate factors, the court decides whether to use the evidence in
question. If the court determines that the individual privacy rights of
the accused outweigh the societal interest in the presentation of all
relevant evidence, 269 the evidence will be excluded, even if the police
have followed all the rules.
The mechanics of the German system are demonstrated by three
cases in which the courts excluded a diary,270 a tape recording of a
private conversation, 271 and the files of a drug rehabilitation clinic2 72
on the ground that use of the evidence in court would violate the pri-
vacy rights of the defendant. The courts reached these results even
though the legality of the seizures was conceded in the first two cases.
In the Diary Case,273 the federal court of appeals considered whether
the defendant's diary was properly admissible in a perjury trial. The
police had been given the diary by the wife of the defendant's par-
amour, in whose home it had been concealed. Applying the balancing
test required by the principle of proportionality, the court reversed the
defendant's conviction on the ground that using the defendant's pri-
vate diary against her in court violated her privacy rights under arti-
267. Decision of Sept. 3, 1991, 1992 BVerfGE at 61.
268. But see Claus Rogall, Gegenwdrtiger Stand und Entwicklungstendenzen der Lehre von
den Strafprozessualen Beweis Verboten, 91 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR DIE GASAMTE STRAFRECHTSWIS-
SENSCHAFr [ZSTW] 1, 12 (1979) (discussing and criticizing the focus on the purity-of-the-pro-
cess doctrine).
269. See generally, 1 L~wE-ROSENBERG, DIE STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND DES GERICHT-
SVERFASSUNGSGEsETz, Einleitung ch. 14, para. 1 (23d ed. 1976) (observing that the search for
truth in criminal investigations is limited by the commands of justice, which forbid investigatory
means that "are unreasonable, grossly violate the proportionality principle, offend human dig-
nity, or are not related to the development of the truth," and claiming that "[t]he exclusionary
rules serve the purpose of enforcing these interests") (author's translation).
270. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, 19 BGHSt 325.
271. Judgment of Jan. 31, 1973, 34 BVerfGE 238.
272. Judgment of May 24, 1977, 44 BVerfG 353.
273. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, 19 BGHSt 325.
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dles 1 and 2 of the constitution.274 The court emphasized, however,
that the mere fact that the defendant's privacy rights were implicated
did not automatically require exclusion, and stressed that exclusion
was appropriate in this instance because the gravity of the intrusion
outweighed the minor nature of the criminal charge. The court sug-
gested that a criminal's diary entries concerning his felonies, or a for-
eign agent's entries concerning his spying activities, would not be
protected, because the interests of the state in prosecuting the offense
would outweigh the privacy interests of the defendant.275 Similarly,
business papers that did not expose the personality of the author
would not be excluded, because there would not be a privacy interest
to weigh against the state's interest in securing the admissibility of all
relevant evidence.2 76
This case illustrates some of the differences between the operation
of exclusionary rules in Germany and in the United States. In the
United States, the diary would have been admissible because it was
obtained without police misconduct, 277 whereas a gun obtained pursu-
ant to a defective search warrant would have been excluded.278 In
contrast, the diary was excluded in Germany, whereas an illegally
seized gun might be admissible because its use would not interfere
with the free development of the defendant's personality. Only a bru-
tal or deceitful seizure that violated the defendant's most fundamental
constitutional rights under the Rechsstaatsprinzip would automatically
result in exclusion of a gun. A diary is subject to different treatment,
274. Id. at 326-27; GG art. 2, para. 2. The Diary Case was the first to hold explicitly that
exclusion could be based on a violation of constitutional rights. The court reached this result
even though the exclusionary provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure - for example,
StPO § 136a, which excludes coerced confessions - were not applicable, and thereby prepared
the way for the subsequent expansion of the exclusionary rule based on the broad constitutional
principles discussed above. The basic concept of exclusion, however, is not a new one in Ger-
many; it was first set forth in 1903. 46 E. BELING, DIE BEWEISVERBOTE ALS GRENZEN DER
WAHRHEITSERFORSCHUNG IM STRAFPROZESS IN STRAFRECHTLICHEN ABHANDLUNGEN (THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULES AS THE BORDERS OF THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH IN CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE) 37 (1903).
275. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, 19 BGHSt at 331. Indeed, in 1989, the Constitutional Court
affirmed, by an equally divided court, the conviction of a murderer whose legally obtained, diary-
like notes were used against him. Judgment of Sept. 14, 1989, 80 BVerfGE 367.
276. Judgment of Sept. 14, 1989, 80 BVerfGE 367.
277. The diary would be admissible in the United States even if it were turned over to the
police by a thief who had ransacked the defendant's home. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465, 476 (1921). The focus in the United States is on police misconduct, without regard to
whether a substantial invasion of the defendant's privacy has occurred. But see Craig M. Brad-
ley, Constitutional Protection for Private Papers, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 461 (1981) (argu-
ing that past Supreme Court decisions and constitutional theory provide support for the
proposition that private papers should receive greater constitutional protection than do guns and
narcotics).
278. See, eg., Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1971) (excluding tools and old
coins).
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however, because its use in court constitutes a harsh incursion on an
individual's personal privacy, whether or not it was legally
obtained.2
79
By excluding a legally seized diary but holding that diaries or other
private personal papers may be used as evidence in prosecutions of
more serious crimes, the court in the Diary Case gave the police little
guidance in deciding when such documents should be seized. As the
case indicated, the admissibility of all evidence - unless seized in vio-
lation of the Rechtsstaatsprinzip or a statute requiring exclusion - is
open to consideration by the court, which decides on an ad hoc basis
whether to admit or exclude. Thus, the purpose of the German exclu-
sionary rule has traditionally not been to deter police misconduct.280
Instead, through balancing, the rule operates to maximize privacy in-
terests consistently with society's interest in prosecuting serious
crimes. 281 The statement of the Justice Department that "evidence is
suppressed only when deviation from prescribed standards is thought
to jeopardize its reliability" 282 completely misstates the bases for evi-
dentiary exclusion in Germany.
Similarly, in the Judgment of January 3L 1973 283 the Constitu-
tional Court excluded a tape recording of the planning of a fraud that
had been made by one of the parties to the transaction and turned over
voluntarily to the police. The Court held that use of taped conversa-
tions in court intruded upon the "private sphere" of the individual and
that such recordings would only be admissible in the event of an over-
riding public interest, which was not present in that case. While the
court held that the tape recording was not admissible in this fraud
279. A recent reaffirmation of the diary case may be found in the Decision of January 4, 1988
by the supreme court of Saarbrucken, 9 NEUE ZErrsCHRIFr FOR STRAFRECHT [NSTZ] 424(1989). In a narcotics case, the police, acting pursuant to a search warrant, seized the diaries of
the defendant's "girlfriend" who, unbeknownst to the police, had become his wife, at the apart-
ment where they both lived. The court held that the diary would not be admissible against either
of them because the seizure violated the constitutional principle of "free development of the
personality." But see Decision of Sept. 14, 1989, as discussed in Bradley, supra note 5, at 1040-
41, 1046, in which the Constitutional Court affirmed, by an equally divided vote, the use of a
diary in which the defendant had commented on the tensions within him that, the prosecution
argued, had led him to commit the charged murder.
280. See, e.g., Karl Gissel, Kritische Bemerkungen zum gegenwdrtigen Stand der Lehre Von
den Beweisverboten im Strafverfahren, 34 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 649, 651
(1981). But see FRIEDRICH DENCKER, VERWERTUNGSVERBOTE IM STRAFPROzEss 52 & n.169
(1977). Dencker notes that some scholars contend that the rule should have a deterrent purpose,
id., but concludes that it "is not possible to assume that the legislature created the 'evidence use
prohibitions' that are in existence for disciplinary reasons ...." Id. at 53, 55.
281. The efficient administration of justice is itself a constitutionally guaranteed interest.
Judgment of May 24, 1977, 44 BVerfGE 353, 374.
282. Search Report, supra note 5, at 620.
283. 34 BVerfGE 238.
Winter 1993]
Michigan Journal of International Law
prosecution, it noted that the result might have been different had the
tape been evidence of a crime of violence.284
Finally, in the Judgment of May 24, 1977,285 the Constitutional
Court held that the records of a narcotics treatment center could not
be used when they were obtained during an unwarranted "fishing ex-
pedition" by the police. However, the court again cautioned that in an
investigation of serious crime, or a properly limited search for specific
narcotics violations, seizure and use of such records might be
appropriate. 28 6
In a 1985 article reviewing German exclusionary law, especially
the Judgment of March 17, 1983 287 in which the federal appeals court
excluded evidence when an unlawful wiretap was used in combination
with deception, Walter Pakter concluded that "[r]ecent decisions indi-
cate that the BGH [federal appeals court] now recognizes that illegal
searches by the police occur, and the current trend is to expand the use
of.exclusion to deter misconduct by police or other state officials. '288
But while this may be the "trend" in Germany, such exclusionary de-
cisions are still too rare to have a consistent impact on police behavior,
and the disciplining of police is explicitly not the basis for evidentiary
exclusion. 28 9 This is especially true because a decision by the trial
court "excluding" evidence does not mean that the fact finders (a
mixed panel of judges and private citizens) do not find out about the
excluded evidence. Rather, knowing of it, they are enjoined to disre-
gard it, and the evidence cannot be used to support the statement of
reasons that must accompany each judgment to the appellate court.
This arrangement obviously tends to dilute the impact of any exclu-
sionary rules.290 Nevertheless, the Decision of September 3, 1991 does
seem to reinforce Pakter's view.
In the confessions area, § 136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that, prior to any questioning in court,
the accused shall be informed of the act with which he is charged and of
the applicable penal provisions. It shall be pointed out to him that the
law grants him the right to respond to the accusation, or not to answer
284. Id. at 248. In a recent case, the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court did admit an illicit
tape-recording to prove arson. Judgment of Apr. 12, 1989, reprinted in 42 NJW 2760 (1989).
285. 44 BVerfGE 353.
286. Id. at 379. Similarly, in the Judgment of May 8, 1972, the federal constitutional court
held that information from a doctor's files concerning his treatment of the defendant, though
seized pursuant to a valid warrant, must be excluded from the defendant's extortion trial. 32
BVerfGE 373, 379.
287. 31 BGHSt 304 (1983).
288. Pakter, supra note 224, at 48.
289. Bradley, supra note 5, at 1044 and authorities cited therein.
290. This problem is discussed in more detail, id. at 1063-64.
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regarding the charge, and at all times, even before his examination, to
consult with defense counsel of his choice.
Although this section does not apply on its face to police interroga-
tions, the federal appeals court has held that the police are required to
give these warnings.291 However, until 1992, exclusion by the trial
judge of a confession obtained after a failure to give the warnings was
not required.292 In the important Decision of February 27, 1992,293 the
Fifth Senate of the Federal Court of Appeals (BGH), in an opinion
subscribed to by other Senates, 294 (and thus, apparently, the final word
on the subject) changed this. Citing Miranda v. Arizona, and noting
that Britain, France,295 Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands also
have a mandatory exclusionary rule for such violations, the Court de-
clared that if the interrogation of an accused by the police has not been
preceded by the § 136 warnings, "the admissions may not be used. ' 296
Only minor exceptions, such as where the accused already was aware
of his rights, were discussed, so the exclusionary rule appears to be
mandatory. Moreover, the warning requirement applies "before [the
subject] is questioned as an accused. ' 297 Thus, going further than Mi-
randa, it applies to all interrogations, without regard to whether or not
the suspect is "in custody." However, Germany does not apparently
have any requirement of a warning as to appointment of counsel if the
suspect cannot afford one, much less actually maintain a "duty solici-
tor" who will be available at all times, as in England.
In addition to the warning requirement, § 136a of the Code
provides:
The freedom of the accused to determine and to exercise his will shall
not be impaired by ill-treatment, by fatigue, by physical interference, by
dispensing medicines, by torture, by deception or by hypnosis.... State-
ments which were obtained in violation of these prohibitions may not be
used even if the accused agrees to such use.
Thus, in the Judgment of May 31, 1990,298 the BGH excluded a
confession from an accused who had been informed that the police
were investigating a "missing person" report when, in fact, they had
291. Judgment of June 7, 1983, 31 BGHSt 395.
292. Id. at 400.
293. Reprinted in 22 NJW 1463 (1992).
294. Id. at 1467.
295. The German Court correctly noted, as discussed above, that the warning requirement in
France applies only to judicial, not police, interrogations.
296. Decision of Feb. 27, 1992, supra note 293, at 1463.
297. Id. at 1464.
298. 4 StR 112.
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already found the body, and were investigating a murder.299 However,
subsequent statements, made after the accused had been informed of
the true nature of the investigation, were admissible. Similarly, earlier
cases had excluded confessions where an accused confessed after being
arrested at 5:00 a.m. and deprived of sleep for thirty hours, 3°° and
where the accused had been confronted with the corpse of his three
year old son, whom he was accused of murdering.30' By the same
token, according to Pakter, "arbitrary prolongations of arrest and mis-
treatment of suspects are no longer considered a problem.... [A]ny
statement obtained [after the permitted 24 hour time limit on deten-
tions30 2 ] would be excluded under § 136(a). 303
In conclusion, Germany, in common with the growing interna-
tional trend, has a fairly detailed code of procedure that generally re-
quires meaningful search warrants, and Miranda-type warnings prior
to interrogation. Moreover, the Germans are increasingly using evi-
dentiary exclusion as a means of enforcing the mandates of the code,
despite the claims of the German courts that this is not the purpose of
exclusion.
ITALY
In 1989, Italy adopted a new code of criminal procedure to replace
the Fascist inspired Codice Rocco that, with many alterations and
amendments, had been in effect for fifty years.3°4 The new code con-
tains 746 articles that cover the entire criminal process from investiga-
tion to appeals.305 In general, the thrust of the code has been to
transform Italy's criminal justice system from an inquisitorial to an
accusatorial model, and to codify "many aspects of the American
Supreme Court's 'criminal procedure revolution' of the 1960s. ' 306
299. Cf Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987), where the Supreme Court held that it was
not necessary that the suspect be accurately informed of the subject matter of the investigation.
300. Judgment of Mar. 24, 1959, 13 BGHSt 60.
301. Judgment of Oct. 7, 1960, 15 BGHSt 187.
302. StPO § 128.
303. Pakter, supra note 224, at 20.
304. For a discussion of the background of the code reform in Italy, see Jeffrey J. Miller,
Note, Plea Bargaining and its Analogues Under the New Italian Criminal Procedure Code and In
the United States" Towards a New Understanding of Comparative Criminal Procedure, 22
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 215, 221-22 (1990).
305. Codice di procedura penale [C.P.P.], enacted by Pres. Decree, Law No. 447 of Sept. 22,
1988, 250 Gazz Uff.
306. Lawrence J. Fassler, Note, The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Adversarial System of
Criminal Procedure in Continental Europe, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245, 246 (1991). Ac-
cording to Miller, supra note 304, there are three major aspects to the Italian reform: 1) creating
a "more partisan relationship between the public prosecutor and the defense counsel, while the
judge retains a more impartial position in the process;" 2) making the trial more than a "brief
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Under the new code, police officials may frisk persons caught in
flagrante delicto, fugitives, or individuals named in a "cautionary"
custodial order.30 7 The code only permits warrantless searches of a
crime scene under three circumstances: when a person is caught in
flagrante delicto, when a fugitive is evading police officers, or when an
arrest warrant has been issued for a suspected criminal. 30 8 In addi-
tion, the code allows searches of domiciles at any hour of the night
when delay could prejudice the case. 30 9 However, one major excep-
tion potentially could swallow up much of the rule: police may also
perform warrantless searches of places where weapons are thought to
be hidden, and this may permit them in practice to search homes for
evidence of almost any crime under the pretense of looking for weap-
ons. 310 This power is limited to "cases of necessity and urgency, 311
so the Italian courts may, in theory at least, exclude evidence found
when the police cannot make such a showing.
In contrast to the flexible restrictions on searches, stringent rules
limit interrogations. No statements made by persons under investiga-
tion at the scene of the crime can be documented or used if a defense
attorney is not present. 312 Police officers may only employ informa-
tion given by suspects, in the absence of defense counsel, in order to
continue immediate investigations and inq~iries.313 Furthermore, an
individual not yet officially under investigation who starts to make in-
criminating declarations in front of judicial authorities or police must
be interrupted, warned of the inculpatory potential of such statements,
and invited to nominate a defense attorney.314
public formality at the end of the investigation" as it was under the old system; and 3) introduc-
ing "special procedures to eliminate the majority of cases before the trial stage" such as plea
bargaining and summary trials. Id. at 224-26. In particular, at trial, the accused now has a right
to counsel, C.P.P. arts. 104, 364(2), a right to silence, id. art. 64, and a right to confront, and have
his counsel cross-examine, witnesses against him, id. arts. 195(3), 498).
307. C.P.P. arts. 352(1), 352(2).
308. Id.
309. Id. arts. 251, 352(3).
310. Fassler, supra note 306, at 256. Compare Canada's "weapons exception" to the search
warrant requirement, discussed supra note 161 and accompanying text, which does not apply to
domicile searches. Presumably this also allows frisks for weapons even when the suspect is not
caught red-handed.
311. Id. at 255.
312. C.P.P. art. 350(6).
313. Id. art. 350(5).
314. Id. art. 63. When "specific and exceptional cautionary reasons" exist, the preliminary
investigation judge may delay the exercise of the suspect's right to confer with an attorney for up
to seven days. Id. art. 104(3). (But uncounselled statements still may not be used at the trial.)
In addition, the prosecutor can suspend the right of an arrested person to confer with counsel
until the time the accused first appears in court. Id. art. 104(4). The period between arrest and
the first court date could conceivably be up to four days. Id. arts. 390(1), 390(2).
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Statements made without an attorney present may not even be used
to impeach.3 15 Thus, not only has Italy, in essence, adopted the Mi-
randa warnings, it has completely barred confessions from the trial
unless the confession is given in the attorney's presence.316 This seems
extreme, and raises concerns that the courts will find ways to get
around strict enforcement of the rules. If Italy is concerned about the
police falsifying or forcing confessions, a tape recording requirement
similar to Australia's would largely eliminate the first concern and
help to alleviate the second.
In addition to being able to demand the presence of defense coun-
sel at any interrogation, 31 7 the suspect is also entitled to the assistance
of counsel during cross-examinations of witnesses, scientific tests, and
searches and seizures. 318 This right can be avoided by the police only
if "justified urgency" requires them to proceed without the presence of
defense counsel.319
Finally, and most significantly, the code expressly provides that
"[e]vidence acquired in violation of prohibitions established by law
cannot be used [in court]. ' 320 Unfortunately, the Italian experience
with this new code has not yet been reported in English. Because of
the broad "weapons" exception to the warrant requirement discussed
above, the code's exclusionary rule may be "best considered as a pro-
hibition against illegally coerced testimonial evidence. ' 321 However,
this may prove to be an underestimation of the exclusionary rule's im-
pact, since the requirement of counsel at various stages of the investi-
gation listed above, absent "justified urgency," also seems ripe for
police violation, and hence, exclusionary sanction.
There was some tradition of evidentiary exclusion under the old
code. The inadmissibility of uncounseled confessions, for example,
was established in 1974.322 After 1978, the police were allowed to seek
and use "summary inquiries" made in the absence of the suspect's
315. Decision of the Constitutional Court of May 23, 1991, 259 Gazz. Uff. The Court struck
down one clause of C.P.P. art. 350(7) permitting the limited use of spontaneous statements made
without a defense attorney to contest testimony at trial.
316. Id. Statements made to thepolice, with the defense attorney present may only be used
to impeach, not in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
317. C.P.P. art. 364.
318. C.P.P. arts. 498, 360, 305, 356. See also Ennio Amodio & Eugenio Selvaggi, An Accusa-
torial System in a Civil Law Country: The 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, 62 TEMP.
L.Q. 1211, 1222 (1989).
319. Fassler, supra note 306, at 253 n.50.
320. C.P.P. art. 191(1).
321. Fassler, supra note 306, at 256.
322. Pakter, supra note 224, at 24. "Exclusion plays a central role in Italian law in control-
ling police interrogations." Id.
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counsel for investigatory purposes, but the statements themselves were
inadmissible in court and excluded from the dossier.323 Statements
made without warnings as to silence and counsel are "unusable in any
way" in a trial.324 That is, even evidence derived from unwarned, as
opposed to uncounseled, statements has been held inadmissible.325
In contrast to the German courts, which, prior to 1991 at least,
had distinguished the illegal search from the seizure and only auto-
matically excluded evidence from inappropriately performed seizures,
the Italian Court of Cassation has held that:
Once the nullity of a search has been ascertained according to art. 185 of
the [old] code of criminal procedure, the consequences cannot be
avoided. Rather, if the act of the search is void, the efficacy of the
seizure can no longer be discussed, and thus the evidence gained from
the seizure cannot be used. 32 6
Thus, Italy, with the most recent recodification of the countries
studied, stands as an important example of the fact that not only do
other countries consider a code to be the way to declare rules, and use
an exclusionary rule to deter police violations, but that some nations
deem it appropriate to impose limitations on the police as strong as,
and in some cases stronger than, those imposed by the Warren Court.
CONCLUSION
Four trends emerge from the comparative analysis in this article.
First, every country examined here except the United States agrees
that the declaration of criminal procedure rules is, at least primarily,
the province of the legislative, not the judicial branch. The legislature
enacts rules in a code that the police can learn and obey, rather than in
a series of court opinions. Second, most countries require Miranda-
type warnings prior to interrogation. If the requirement of such warn-
ings in the United States was once aberrational, that is no longer the
case. Third, exclusionary remedies are finding increasing favor as a
means of deterring police breaches of the rules, even though the courts
of two countries, Canada and Germany, continue to maintain that de-
terrence of police misconduct is not the purpose of the exclusionary
rule. Fourth, these exclusionary remedies tend, except in the case of
coerced confessions, to be discretionary, rather than mandatory as in
the United States. Nonetheless, they tend to be enforced often enough
323. Id. at 24. Compare the German method, discussed above, where "excluded" evidence is
not referred to in court, but remains in the dossier.
324. Judgment of Feb. 20, 1974, 127 Giurisprudenza Italiana [Giur.Ital.] II 432, 436.
325. Id.
326. Judgment of Sept. 26, 1980, 133 Giur. Ital. 11 113 (The evidence was nevertheless ad-
mitted because the issue was first raised on appeal).
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to have an impact on the police, at least in Canada and England, in-
creasingly in Germany, and perhaps in Italy and Australia as well.
It seems that these countries, influenced by U.S. developments,
may have the right idea: develop, either directly through the legisla-
ture or by means of a legislatively appointed body, a comprehensive
code of rules, all of which may be enforced with the exclusionary rem-
edy so that the police are encouraged to obey them. Then, use that
remedy often, but only when, on balance, the use of the evidence
would be unfair or would bring the administration of justice into disre-
pute. The clearer the rules that the police are supposed to follow, the
more likely that their failure to follow them will cause the public to
lose confidence in the justice system. Thus, on the admittedly frequent
(but far less frequent than is currently the case) occasions when the
statutory rules would not give the police clear guidance, evidentiary
exclusion would ordinarily be inappropriate. But, when the rules are
clear, evidentiary exclusion would be the norm, at least for violations
of non-technical rules. However, other factors, such as the seriousness
of the crime, the quantum of evidence possessed by the police, the
willfulness of the violation, and the importance of the evidence to the
government's case, could also figure into the equation.
My experiences in Germany in 1982 and Australia in 1989 had led
me to believe that a "discretionary" exclusionary rule was no exclu-
sionary rule - a remedy that was paid lip service by the courts but
was not seriously enforced, and hence had no substantial impact on
police behavior. However, my study of the British and Canadian sys-
tems, as well as recent developments in Italy, and in Germany and
Australia themselves, has convinced me that a discretionary system
can function effectively as long as it is based on clear, codified rules
and taken seriously by the courts, particularly the nation's highest
court. I see no reason to believe that U.S. courts, with a thirty year
tradition of evidentiary exclusion to deter police misconduct, could
not be trusted to rigorously apply a discretionary rule, just as British
and Canadian courts, with no such tradition, seem to have done.
A switch by the U.S. to a non-mandatory exclusionary rule would,
in most cases, lead to the same result (non-exclusion) as does the cur-
rent "mandatory" but inconsistently enforced rule. However, such a
switch only makes sense if it is accompanied by a comprehensive code
of criminal procedure that clearly spells out the rights and duties of
both police and citizenry. Our current confusing rules too easily lend
themselves to legitimate police misunderstanding, and consequently to
unduly erratic exclusionary decisions by trial judges. The English ex-
perience in particular demonstrates that, if the rules are clearly spelled
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out, and divorced from the exclusionary remedy, a discretionary ex-
clusionary rule, used only when clear rules are clearly broken, can be
an apparently effective deterrent to police misconduct, at a lesser cost
in terms of the loss of probative evidence.327
The question of whether the United States could and should have a
national code of criminal procedure is discussed in detail in my forth-
coming book, The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolution.3 28 In
that book, I argue that once the Supreme Court "incorporated" the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments into the Fourteenth, it also au-
tomatically gave Congress the power to legislate a code of procedure
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment which provides that "The
Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article." Such a code should be drafted, and kept
up to date, by a body created for that purpose, similar to the current
federal rules drafting committees. Its product should be subject to an
"aye or nay" vote in Congress, but not to congressional amendment.
Of course, the Supreme Court would retain authority to determine the
constitutionality of particular provisions and, in the unlikely event
that the committee did not act first, to resolve conflicts among the
States and Circuits as to the meaning of those provisions. A federal
criminal procedure code, while not without its administrative difficul-
ties, would solve the most pressing problem of our current system:
that a Court deciding issues on a case-by-case basis is simply not
suited to declare a comprehensive set of rules.
329
327. I say "apparently effective" because there is no way to say for certain that either the
English or the U.S. approach effectively deters police misconduct, much less which one works
the best. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the English rules are much clearer and more compre-
hensive than the U.S. Rules. It would seem to follow that exclusion when the police commit
serious breaches of the rules is an easier matter to determine in Britain, and consequently, a more
effective, even though less frequently employed, deterrent.
328. Supra note 15.
329. I first discussed the particular mechanisms by which Court decisions create unnecessary
problems in the law of criminal procedure in Craig M. Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the
Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1; and that discussion is reiterated, and, to a limited extent,
enlarged upon in my book. An example: when the Court decides, as it did in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), that police may "stop and frisk" a suspect if they have reasonable suspicion that he
is armed and dangerous and that "criminal activity is afoot," that decision is based on a particu-
lar set of facts. In the next case, where the facts vary, such as that criminal activity is not
"afoot," police receive no guidance from Terry. (See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221
(1985), finally deciding, seventeen years later, that past criminal activity can provide grounds for
a "stop and frisk.") A code could have resolved the Hensley issue, as well as the many other
questions raised by Terry, Miranda, and the other Warren Court cases, in advance. It can still
answer the myriad unanswered questions present in current criminal procedure law.
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